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IN CANADA, EVIDENCE OBTAINED by police or other state actors in violation of

the fundamental procedural norms set out in the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms may be excluded at trial in prosecutions of criminal and regulatory
offences if the court decides that admitting it could “bring the administration
of justice into disrepute.”1 The exclusion of potentially reliable and probative
evidence is a powerful remedy for police misconduct that may contribute to the
acquittal of the factually guilty.2 It is therefore no surprise that section 24(2) of
the Charter—the provision instantiating the exclusionary power—has generated
vast quantities of appellate and academic commentary.
Much less has been written about the way that section 24(2) is applied
at trial. For several decades, courts have been deciding whether to exclude
1.
2.

S 24(2), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
See R v Harrison, 2009 SCC 34 at para 42 [Harrison] (“[T]he price paid by
society for an acquittal in these circumstances is outweighed by the importance of
maintaining Charter standards”).
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unconstitutionally obtained evidence and explaining their reasons for doing so.
We mined this rich dataset to identify factors influencing the decision to exclude
or admit evidence obtained in violation of the Charter.
Ours is not the first quantitative study of section 24(2) decisions. Several
researchers have used coding methods and descriptive statistics to examine how
judges decide whether to exclude evidence obtained from Charter violations.3 Our
study is the first, however, to use inferential statistical methods to isolate variables
correlating with the exclusionary decision at trial.4 It is also the first to examine
not only the “internal,” doctrinal variables derived from positive law, but also the
“external,” non-legal variables (such as judges’ gender and political affiliation)
examined in the political science and realist legal literature on adjudication.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we examine the
jurisprudence and scholarly literature needed to provide context for the research
questions posed, i.e., determining the significance (if any) of a host of internal and
external variables on the exclusionary decision. Part II summarizes our research
methodology and Part III our findings, which reveal the unimportance of judicial
gender, party of appointment, and court level to the exclusionary decision and
the importance of judges’ legal practice background, province, gender of the
accused, and offence seriousness. Part IV discusses the policy implications of
these findings and Part V concludes.

3.

4.

See Mike Madden, “Empirical Data on Section 24(2) under R v Grant” (2010) 78 Crim
Reports (6th) 278; Mike Madden, “Marshalling the Data: An Empirical Analysis of Canada’s
Section 24(2) Case Law in the Wake of R. v. Grant” (2011) 15 Can Crim L Rev 229
[Madden, “Marshalling”]; Thierry Nadon, “Le paragraphe 24(2) de la Charte au Québec
depuis Grant: si la tendance se maintient!” (2011) 86 Crim Reports (6th) 33; Ariane Asselin,
“Trends for Exclusion of Evidence in 2012” (2013) 1 Crim Reports (7th) 74 [Asselin,
“Trends”]; Ariane Asselin, The Exclusionary Rule in Canada: Trends and Future Directions
(LLM Thesis, Queen’s University Faculty of Law, 2013); Nathan JS Gorham, “Eight Plus
Twenty-Four Two Equals Zero-Point-Five” (2003) 6 Crim Reports (6th) 257; Richard
Jochelson, Debao Huang & Melanie Murchison, “Empiricizing Exclusionary Remedies—A
Cross Canada Study of Exclusion of Evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, Five Years After
Grant” (2016) 63 Crim LQ 206 at 219; Benjamin Johnson, Richard Jochelson & Victoria
Weir, “Exclusion of Evidence Under Section 24(2) of the Charter Post-Grant in the Years
2014-2017: A Comprehensive Analysis of 600 Cases” (2019) 67 Crim LQ 57.
For a recent analysis of section 24(2) decisions in five provincial appellate courts using similar
inferential statistical methods, See Lori Hausegger, Danielle McNabb & Troy Riddell, “The
Provincial Courts of Appeal and the Exclusionary Rule: Decision Making and Hierarchical
Relations in the Charter Era” in Kate Puddister & Emmett Macfarlane, eds, Constitutional
Imperatives: Contemplations on Charter Rights, Reconciliation and Constitutional Change (UBC
Press) [forthcoming].
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I. CONTEXT
A. EMPIRICAL SCHOLARSHIP

Few academics, lawyers, or even judges deny that some judicial decisions are
influenced by non-textual factors; that is, those lying outside positive law. Efforts
to describe, measure, and quantify these influences have been ongoing since at
least the early twentieth century.5 In recent decades, however, political scientists
and legal academics have developed a robust literature (using increasingly
sophisticated research designs and statistical tools) investigating these external
influences on judicial outcomes. Most of this research has been of courts in
the United States, though there is an emergent literature in Canada and other
jurisdictions.6 The research has also focused disproportionately on appellate courts
as opposed to trial courts. To our knowledge, there have been no quantitative
studies of external influence on Canadian trial decisions. That said, it is helpful
to describe key findings from the scholarship on US appellate and trial courts and
Canadian appellate courts in order to contextualize our study.
1.

THE UNITED STATES

The most basic finding from the US research is that federally appointed appellate
judges (i.e., from the US Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals) tend
to vote ideologically.7 Simply put, this means that in most legal domains there
are high positive correlations between various ex ante and ex post measures
of judges’ policy preferences (almost always characterized as conservative/
liberal) and similarly characterized case outcomes.8 The most common proxy
for ex ante judicial ideology is the political party of the appointing President
(Republican/conservative or Democrat/liberal). While there are limitations to

5.
6.
7.
8.

See e.g. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Brentano’s, 1930) at 110-11; Sheldon
Goldman, “Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964” (1966) 60
American Political Science Rev 374.
See generally Benjamin Alarie & Andrew J Green, Commitment and Cooperation on High
Courts: A Cross-Country Examination of Institutional Constraints on Judges (Oxford
University Press, 2017) at 10-11 [Alarie & Green, Commitment and Cooperation].
See e.g. Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Cass R Sunstein et al, Are Judges Political?
An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (Brookings Institution Press, 2006).
See generally Lee Epstein, William M Landes & Richard A Posner, The Behavior of Federal
Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice (Harvard University Press,
2013) at 65-89.
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the methodologies used,9 viewed in the aggregate, the literature reveals robust and
enduring support for ideological judging, often referred to as the “attitudinal”
model of adjudication.10
That said, the US research also suggests that attitudinal influences may be
muted in certain legal domains and in the lower levels of the court hierarchy.
At the US Supreme Court, evidence for ideological voting is strong for most
issues, including criminal justice.11 But in the federal courts of appeal, evidence

9.

See generally Frank B Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (Stanford
University Press, 2007) at 20-21; Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 46-47, 70-77;
CL Ostberg & Matthew E Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court
of Canada (University of British Columbia Press, 2007) at 45-48 [Ostberg & Wetstein,
Attitudinal Decision Making]; Emmett MacFarlane, Governing from the Bench: The
Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Role (University of British Columbia Press,
2013) at 21-26.
10. See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 77-85; Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter
Wiedenbeck, “The Ideological Component of Judging in the Taxation Context” (2006)
84 Washington U L Rev 1797 at 1799-1809; Sara C Benesh & Wendy L Martinek, “State
Supreme Court Decision Making in Confession Cases” (2002) 23 Justice System J 109
at 110-14; Alarie & Green, Commitment and Cooperation, supra note 6 at 12-13. Note
that many scholars differentiate between strictly “attitudinal” models of adjudication,
in which judges decide solely on the basis of their attitudes or policy preferences, and
“strategic” models, in which judges moderate the influence of their preferences with
other considerations, such as their decisions’ effects on other judges and institutions,
including legislatures. See Benjamin RD Alarie & Andrew Green, “The Reasonable Justice:
An Empirical Analysis of Frank Iacobucci’s Career on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007)
57 UTLJ 195 at 202 [Alarie & Green, “The Reasonable Justice”]. Still other researchers have
posited a more purely economic “rational choice” model of adjudication, in which judges
seek to maximize utility along a range of parameters, including imposing their preferences as
well as achieving myriad personal and professional goals. See e.g. Epstein, Landes & Posner,
supra note 8. In this paper, we use the term “attitudinal” as shorthand for whatever portion of
adjudication may be determined by a judge’s ex ante policy preferences as opposed to purely
legal or case-specific considerations.
11. See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 112-13, Table 3.5 (showing substantial voting
differences in criminal procedure cases between Republican- and Democrat-appointed
justices with an especially strong tendency for Republican judges to vote conservatively in
such cases); Ward Farnsworth, “Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s
Criminal Docket” (2005) 104 Mich L Rev 67.
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of ideological judging is weaker in criminal cases than in many other domains.12
Attitudinal influences are weaker for all types of cases at this level than at the US
Supreme Court13 and are weaker still at the federal trial level.14
Several explanations have been offered for these disparities, some of which
are backed by empirical evidence. One is that lower court judges moderate their
ideological predilections to avoid reversal on appeal (thereby enhancing their
professional reputation or promotional prospects).15 Indeed, there is evidence
(both generally16 and in criminal cases17) that federal district judges’ decisions
more closely adhere to their own ideologies (as estimated by party of appointment)
when the court of appeal above them is comprised predominantly of judges with
the same affiliation. Judges who face the prospect of review by a court dominated
by the opposing party, in contrast, are less likely to decide in accordance with their
normative preferences.18 It has also been suggested that evidence of ideological
judging in criminal cases at the intermediate appellate level is weakened by the
fact that defendants appeal much more frequently than prosecutors (often with
12. See Sunstein et al, supra note 7 at 149; Jeffrey A Segal, Harold J Spaeth & Sara C Benesh,
The Supreme Court in the American Legal System (Cambridge University Press, 2005)
at 237-38; Cross, supra note 9 at 27-29 (small but statistically significant evidence of
ideological judging in criminal procedure cases). But see Ward Farnsworth, “The Role
of Law in Close Cases: Some Evidence from the Federal Courts of Appeals” (2006) 86
BUL Rev 1083; Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 168 (Republican judges more
likely to vote conservatively in criminal than in civil cases, though differences between
Republican and Democratic judges are small for both types); Benesh & Martinek, supra note
10 at 122 (voluntary confession cases slightly influenced by ideology but not statistically
significant); Jeffrey A Segal, Avani Mehta Sood & Benjamin Woodson, “The ‘Murder Scene
Exception’—Myth or Reality? Empirically Testing the Influence of Crime Severity in Federal
Search-and-Seizure Cases” (2019) 105 Va L Rev 543 at 577-78 (judicial ideology had a
modest effect in predicting search and seizure exclusionary decisions in federal appellate
courts but only in cases involving a potential life sentence or the death penalty).
13. See Jeffrey A Segal, “Judicial Behavior” in Keith E Whittington, R Daniel Kelemen &
Gregory A Caldeira, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford University
Press, 2008) 19 at 27; Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 168.
14. See Daniel R Pinello, “Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts:
A Meta-Analysis” (1999) 20 Justice System J 219 at 242.
15. Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 83.
16. See Kirk A Randazzo, “Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S. District
Courts” (2008) 36 American Politics Research 669.
17. See Max M Schanzenbach & Emerson H Tiller, “Strategic Judging Under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence” (2007) 23
JL Econ & Org 24.
18. This “reversal aversion” effect is likely much stronger for trial judges than for judges at
intermediate appellate courts, since the former’s decisions are much more likely to be
reviewed on appeal than the latter’s. See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 84.
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little merit), and as a consequence, both liberal and conservative judges most
often vote to affirm convictions.19
It is also likely that attitudinal and other external influences on adjudication
wane in comparison to internal legal factors as one moves down the judicial
ladder.20 At the intermediate appellate level and (especially) at trial, case
outcomes are more likely to be dictated by legalist considerations.21 Lower court
judges (especially trial judges) see many more cases that can be decided based on
straightforward applications of existing law.22 Indeed, in a comprehensive review
of the available datasets, Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner
found only slight evidence of partisan-ideological divergence in civil cases at
federal district (trial) courts.23
On the other hand, trial judges must sometimes make highly discretionary
decisions involving contentious policy matters. For some of these decision types,
the prospect of reversal will be slight, either because the type is so common that
proportionally few decisions are appealed or because appeal courts treat such
decisions deferentially.24 The section 24(2) decision arguably fits this profile.
All else equal, we might expect these kinds of trial-level decisions to be more
ideologically motivated than most.25 The few studies testing this hypothesis in the

19. Ibid at 159-64. Using the party of appointment method, the ratio of conservative votes
of federal appellate judges in criminal cases is 76 Republican to 69 Democrat; using the
senatorial courtesy method, the ratio 79 conservative to 68 liberal). This effect is not nearly
as pronounced at the US Supreme Court level, which has a (highly selective) discretionary
jurisdiction and thus typically chooses only to hear criminal appeals with arguable merit (ibid
at 234). The ratio of conservative to liberal outcomes at the US Supreme Court is 1.17 to 1;
at courts of appeals, the ratio is 1.59 to 1 (ibid).
20. Ibid at 231-36; Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 9 at 58.
21. Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 213-20 (the only criminal cases included in the
dataset were capital punishment cases where Republican judges were slightly more likely
to rule conservatively than Democratic judges, but the difference was not statistically
significant (p>5)).
22. Ibid at 180-83, 237. At the federal courts of appeals, there is also evidence of a substantial
“conformity effect”: All other things being equal, judges of a particular court are more
likely to vote in the direction of the dominant party of that court. This effect dampens the
ideological valence of individual votes, since Democrats are more likely to vote conservatively
when they are in the minority and vice versa (ibid at 197-99).
23. Ibid at 213; see also Pinello, supra note 14 at 242.
24. See Corey Rayburn Yung, “Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism
in the Federal Courts” (2011) 105 Nw UL Rev 1 at 20-21.
25. Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 11-12, 226-27, 237-38.
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United States, however, have revealed little evidence of ideological judging, even
for discretionary trial decisions.26
Compared to the empirical literature in the United States on the influence of
partisan affiliation and other proxies for political ideology, less research has been
conducted on whether other aspects of judicial background (such as gender, race,
seniority, and professional experience) influence decision making.27 The studies
that have been done (mostly involving federal appellate courts) have tended to
find little effect over the general range of cases.28 The consensus explanation is
that ideology predominates in the selection process and largely cancels out other
background factors.29
There is some evidence, however, that some background characteristics may
have an effect in certain types of cases.30 Some studies have shown either that
former prosecutors were more likely to render conservative decisions in criminal
cases than other judges31 or that former criminal defence lawyers were more likely

26. See ibid at 240-53 (for federal district courts, only very slight evidence of ideological judging
in civil cases, but greater (but still modest) evidence in sentencing cases). Interestingly, this
study did show that both Republican and Democratic district judges sentence more harshly
when the court of appeals were dominated by Republicans, suggesting that reversal aversion
may be robust even for highly discretionary trial-level decisions (ibid at 253).
27. For exceptions, see e.g. “Judicial Background and Circuit Court Decision Making” in Cross,
supra note 9, 69.
28. See Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
(Cambridge University Press, 1993); Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 169-70;
Christina L Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D Martin, “Untangling the Causal Effects of
Sex on Judging” (2010) 54 American J Political Science 389. Not surprisingly, there are
exceptions. See e.g. Morris B Hoffman et al, “The Intersectionality of Age and Gender on
the Bench: Are Younger Female Judges Harsher with Serious Crimes?” (2020) 40 Colum
J Gender & L 128 (finding that young female judges in Colorado imposed substantially
greater punishments for serious crimes than male or older female judges).
29. Cross, supra note 9 at 69-70, 74, 92-93.
30. See generally ibid at 73-74.
31. See C Neal Tate, “Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946–1978” (1981) 75
American Political Science Rev 355 at 362; Stuart S Nagel, “Judicial Backgrounds and
Criminal Cases” (1962) 53 J Crim L & Criminology 333 at 336 (among federal and state
supreme court judges in 1955, former prosecutors voted more conservatively in criminal
cases). But see Cross, supra note 9 at 83-85 (among federal courts of appeals judges in
criminal cases, former assistant district attorneys voted more conservatively; but district
attorneys, US attorneys, assistant US attorneys, and special prosecutors did not).
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to rule liberally.32 Some researchers (but not all)33 have also found that female
judges vote more liberally in criminal cases than men.34
Research has also shown that, apart from attitudinal factors stemming from
judicial attributes and backgrounds, judges may be influenced by case-specific
factors exogenous to positive law. Some researchers have found, for example,
that judges of both genders favour female defendants over male defendants in
criminal cases.35 And one study of federal appellate decisions showed that judges
were more likely to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence for more

32. See Gregory C Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P Morriss, “Charting the Influences on the
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning” (1998) 73 NYUL Rev 1377
at 1470-74 (among federal district judges, former defence lawyers are more likely to find
sentencing guidelines unconstitutional; former prosecutors more likely to uphold sentencing
guidelines against specific type of constitutional challenge).
33. See Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 28 at 402-405 (no sex effect in capital punishment
cases in federal courts of appeals); Sue Davis, Susan Haire & Donald R Songer, “Voting
behavior and gender on the U.S. courts of appeals” (1993) 77 Judicature 129 (no sex effect
in search and seizure cases).
34. See Cross, supra note 9 at 77-82 (federal courts of appeals); Donald R Songer & Kelley A
Crews-Meyer, “Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision Making in State Supreme Courts”
(2000) 81 Soc Science Q 750 (female Democratic judges are more likely to cast a liberal
vote than male Democrats in criminal law and civil liberties cases; female Republicans do
not vote differently than their male counterparts); Jeffrey J Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie &
Andrew J Wistrich, “Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight” (2011) 8 J Empirical Leg
Studies 72 at 95 (in some experimental treatments, female judges were slightly less likely to
find probable cause than males). See also Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi,
“Does the Judge Matter? Exploiting Random Assignment on a Court of Last Resort to
Assess Judge and Case Selection Effects” (2012) J Empirical Leg Stud 246 at 272-74, 280-81
(female judges vote more liberally than males in criminal cases at the Israel Supreme Court,
although the finding was sensitive to the inclusion of a single judge).
35. Ibid at 274-75, 281; Jill K Doerner & Stephen Demuth, “Gender and Sentencing in the
Federal Courts: Are Women Treated More Leniently?” (2014) 25 Crim Justice Policy Rev
242; S Fernando Rodriguez, Theodore R Curry & Gang Lee, “Gender Differences in
Criminal Sentencing: Do Effects Vary Across Violent, Property, and Drug Offences?” (2006)
87 Soc Science Q 318; Barbara A Koons-Witt et al, “Gender and Sentencing Outcomes in
South Carolina: Examining the Interactions With Race, Age, and Offense Type” (2014)
25 Crim Justice Policy Rev 299. Judicial bias has also been experimentally demonstrated
in relation to other legally irrelevant defendant characteristics. See e.g., Holger Spamann &
Lars Klöhn, “Justice Is Less Blind, and Less Legalistic, than We Thought: Evidence from an
Experiment with Real Judges” (2016) 45 J Leg Stud 255.
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serious offences than less serious ones, despite the fact that crime severity is not a
doctrinally relevant consideration.36
2.

CANADA

The empirical literature on judging in Canada is not as extensive as in the United
States. The vast majority of studies have been of the Supreme Court of Canada.
Most have shown a modest correlation between party of appointment37 and
the ideological valence of case outcomes, but the strength of the association is

36. Segal, Sood & Woodson, supra note 12 at 572-76. See also Andrew J Wistrich, Jeffrey J
Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, “Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their
Feelings?” (2015) 93 Tex L Rev 855 at 890-93 (experimental evidence that judges are more
likely to suppress unconstitutionally obtained evidence for more serious offences); Jeffrey J
Rachlinski, Andrew J Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, “Altering Attention in Adjudication” (2013)
60 UCLA L Rev 1586 at 1614 (experimental evidence that judges are more likely to convict
when exposed to inadmissible confession evidence when police misconduct was mild).
37. Superior court judges (for our purposes, judges of the provincial and territorial superior trial
courts and courts of appeal) are formally appointed by the Governor General under section
96 of the Constitution Act, 1867. In practice, the appointments are made by the Minister of
Justice in consultation with the Prime Minister and cabinet. Appointments to the Supreme
Court of Canada are made by the “Governor in Council” (i.e., cabinet) under the authority
of section 4(2) of the Supreme Court Act, and indirectly, section 101 of the Constitution
Act, 1867. In practice, the decision is made by the Prime Minister in consultation with
cabinet. See generally Peter McCormick, “Selecting the Supremes: The Appointment of
Judges to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2005) 7 J App Pr & Pro 1. Provincial court
judges are appointed by the provincial justice minister in consultation with cabinet and the
premier. Over the years, both the federal and provincial governments have used nominating
committees to vet prospective candidates. The workings of these committees have varied
across time, jurisdiction, and (within the federal jurisdiction) level of court. See generally
Lori Hausegger, Matthew Hennigar & Troy Riddell, Canadian Courts: Law, Politics,
and Process, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2015) at 135-51, 157-61; Richard Devlin,
A Wayne MacKay & Natasha Kim, “Reducing the Democratic Deficit: Representation,
Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or Towards a ‘Triple P’ Judiciary” (2000) 38 Alta L Rev
734; Lori Hausegger et al, “Exploring the Links between Party and Appointment: Canadian
Federal Judicial Appointments from 1989 to 2003” (2010) 43 Can J Political Science 633 at
634-35; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Policy Preference Change and Appointments
to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 19-20 [Alarie & Green,
“Policy Preference Change”].
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substantially weaker than in the United States.38 Studies isolating criminal cases
have found modest correlations at best.39 Moreover, the only study done to date of
38. See Susan W Johnson, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Strategic Decision Making:
Examining Justices’ Voting Patterns during Periods of Institutional Change” (2012) 42
American Rev Can Studies 236; C Neal Tate & Panu Sittiwong, “Decision Making in the
Canadian Supreme Court: Extending the Personal Attributes Model Across Nations” (1989)
51 J Politics 900 at 907-908; Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change,” supra note 37;
Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Charter Decisions in the McLachlin Era: Consensus and
Ideology at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47 SCLR 475 [Alarie & Green, “Charter
Decisions in the McLachlin Era”]; Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making,
supra note 9; Donald R Songer, The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada:
An Empirical Examination (University of Toronto Press, 2008) [Songer, Transformation of
the Supreme Court]; Susan W Johnson, Donald R Songer & Nadia A Jilani, “Judge Gender,
Critical Mass, and Decision Making in the Appellate Courts of Canada” (2011) 32 J Women
Politics & Policy 237 at 249 (liberal appointees are more likely than conservative appointees
to support criminal defendants in Supreme Court cases from 1982-2007). See also Thaddeus
Hwong, “A Review of Quantitative Studies of Decision Making in the Supreme Court of
Canada” (2003) 30 Man LJ 353 at 367-75 (reviewing Canadian literature). But see Donald
R Songer & Susan W Johnson, “Judicial Decision Making in the Supreme Court of Canada:
Updating the Personal Attribute Model” (2007) 40 Can J Political Science 911 at 923-29
(between 1978-2000, there was no significant correlation between appointing party and
outcomes in criminal, civil liberties, or economic cases). Researchers applying methods
other than “party of appointment” to gauge the degree to which various appellate courts are
“ideological” have come to the same conclusion, i.e., that the Supreme Court of Canada is
markedly less ideological than its US counterpart. See Alarie & Green, Commitment and
Cooperation, supra note 6 at 21; Alarie & Green, “The Reasonable Justice,” supra note 10 at
224; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Should They All Just Get Along? Judicial Ideology,
Collegiality, and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 58 UNBLJ
73 at 76-78 [Alarie & Green, “Should They All Just Get Along?”]; Ostberg & Wetstein,
Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 9 at 191-92, 204-205; Songer, Transformation of
the Supreme Court, supra note 38 at 7-9, 161, 194, 247-49.
39. See Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change,” supra note 37 at 28-36 (finding
conservative-appointed Supreme Court of Canada judges voted only slightly more
conservatively than liberal-appointed judges for both appeals generally and criminal cases);
Nadia A Jilani, Donald R Songer & Susan W. Johnson, “Gender, Consciousness Raising,
and Decision Making on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 94 Judicature 59 at 66
(liberal-appointed judges voted more liberally than conservative ones in criminal cases from
1976-2007); Alarie & Green, “Charter Decisions in the McLachlin Era,” supra note 38 at
490-92, Table 1 (finding only modest partisan differences, mostly attributable to equality
rights cases, between liberal- and conservative-appointed judges in Charter cases decided
between 2000-2009 (including criminal cases)); Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision
Making, supra note 9 at 64, Table 3.4, 214-17 (modest evidence of partisan-ideological
voting in criminal cases); Johnson, supra note 38 at 247 (liberal-appointed judges more
likely to support liberal outcomes in criminal cases, but the effect is substantially larger in
pre-Charter cases); Songer, Transformation of the Supreme Court, supra note 38 at 196-201
(modest correlation between appointing party and outcomes in non-unanimous criminal
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Supreme Court decisions involving criminal procedural rights found no evidence
of the expected ideological divide, i.e., that conservative-appointed judges favour
the prosecution. For the years 1984–2003, C.L. Ostberg and Matthew E. Wetstein
found either no association between party of appointment and outcomes (in
“right to counsel” cases) or a modest negative correlation (in “search and seizure”
cases).40 In other words, liberal and conservative appointees did not differ in right
to counsel cases, but counterintuitively, conservative-appointed judges modestly
favoured the accused in search and seizure cases.41
Many fewer studies have been done of lower courts in Canada. James
Stribopoulos and Moin A. Yahya surveyed decisions of the Court of Appeal for
Ontario from 1990–2003 and found that conservative appointees were slightly
more likely to rule conservatively in Charter criminal matters than liberal
appointees.42 Analyzing the same data using different methods, Lori Hausegger,
Troy Riddell, and Matthew Hennigar found that conservative appointees
were less likely than liberal appointees to vote conservatively in these cases.43
Neither group of researchers found a significant difference in non-Charter
cases.44 Analyzing court of appeal decisions in Ontario, British Columbia,
Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia, Hausegger, Danielle McNabb, and Riddell

40.
41.

42.
43.

44.

cases between 1970-2003). See also Alarie & Green, “Should They All Just Get Along?” supra
note 38 at 77-78.
Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 9 at 85-114, 215, Table 8.1.
For the years 1984-1994, the same researchers found a positive correlation between ideology
and outcomes in search and seizure cases. In that study, however, they used a measure of
ideology that combined party of appointment with an ideology score based on content
analysis of pre-appointment newspaper articles about the judges. Matthew E Wetstein &
CL Ostberg, “Search and Seizure Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada: Extending an
American Model of Judicial Decision Making across Countries” (1999) 80 Soc Sci Q 757.
In their more recent study referred to in the text immediately above, the researchers found
that the newspaper-based metric correlated in the expected direction for both search and
seizure and right to counsel cases. Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra
note 9 at 214-15, Table 8.1.
“Does a Judge’s Party of Appointment or Gender Matter to Case Outcomes?: An Empirical
Study of the Court of Appeal for Ontario” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 315 at 354-55.
Lori Hausegger, Troy Riddell & Matthew Hennigar, “Does Patronage Matter? Connecting
Influences on Judicial Appointments with Judicial Decision Making” (2013) 46 Can J
Political Science 665 at 681. They found, however, that judges with ties to the Liberal
party (whether appointed by a Liberal or Progressive Conservative prime minister) voted
more liberally in criminal cases than those with ties to the Progressive Conservatives.
Ibid at 677-78.
Stribopoulos & Yayha, supra note 42 at 354-55; Hausegger, Riddell & Hennigar, supra
note 43 at 681.

Penney, Yahya, Section 24(2) in the Trial Courts 521

found no significant divergence between liberal and conservative appointees in
section 24(2) decisions.45
These findings do not mean that ideology plays no role in Canadian
appellate decision making. Indeed, studies of voting patterns suggest (as most
would expect) that many judges have distinct ideological profiles,46 though an
individual judge’s profile is not always consistent either over time47 or across
different legal domains.48 It is also possible that judges appointed by different
governments with the same partisan affiliation might differ ideologically.49 It does
mean, however, that party of appointment is generally a weak predictor of votes
and case outcomes, including in criminal cases.

45. Supra note 4 at 17-18; Tables 3 & 4.
46. Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change,” supra note 37 at 34 (showing that many
judges exhibit voting patterns substantially more or less conservative than the median);
Songer, Transformation of the Supreme Court, supra note 38 at 185-93 (same); Ostberg &
Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 9 at 60-68, 76 (Table 4.3); “Attitudinal
Consistency in the Post-Charter Supreme Court” in ibid, 193 (finding that judges exhibited
strong patterns of ideological voting in many domains, including criminal justice, and that
these patterns often correlated strongly with ex ante ideology); CL Ostberg, Matthew E
Wetstein & Craig R Ducat “Attitudinal Dimensions of Supreme Court Decision Making
in Canada: The Lamer Court, 1991–1995” (2002) 55 Political Research Q 235 (same);
C L Ostberg & Matthew Wetstein, “Dimensions of Attitudes Underlying Search and
Seizure Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada” (1998) 31 Can J Political Science
767 (evidence of ideological voting in search and seizure cases); Stribopoulos & Yahya,
supra note 42 at 361-62 (patterns of ideological voting on Ontario Court of Appeal); Panu
Sittiwong, Canadian Supreme Court Decision-making, 1875-1990: Institutional, Group,
and Individual Level Perspectives (PhD Dissertation, University of North Texas, Department
of Political Science, 1994) at 112-40, online (pdf ): <digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/
metadc278740/m2/1/high_res_d/1002721270-sittiwong.pdf> (showing substantial
variations in voting behaviour between Court judges). See also generally S R Peck, “The
Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-1966: A Search for Policy through Scalogram Analysis”
(1967) 45 Can Bar Rev 666; Sidney R Peck, “A Scalogram Analysis of the Supreme Court of
Canada, 1958–1967” in Glendon Schubert & David J Danelski, eds, Comparative Judicial
Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Decision-Making in the East and West (Oxford
University Press, 1969) 293 at 297-324; Donald E Fouts, “Policy-Making in the Supreme
Court of Canada, 1950-1960” at 270-87 in ibid, 257; Michael Bader & Edward Burstein,
“The Supreme Court of Canada 1892-1902: A Study of the Men and the Times” (1970) 8
Osgoode Hall LJ 503.
47. Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change,” supra note 37 at 39-41.
48. See Songer, Transformation of the Supreme Court, supra note 38 at 185-93; Ostberg &
Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 9 at 206-09; Ostberg, Wetstein & Ducat,
supra note 46.
49. We made no attempt, for example, to distinguish between judges appointed during the
tenure of different Liberal (or Conservative) prime ministers.
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Examinations of the effect of gender and other background factors on judicial
decision making in Canada have produced mixed results. Donald R. Songer
found that female Supreme Court justices were more likely to vote conservatively
in criminal cases,50 whereas Ostberg and Wetstein found no correlation between
judges’ gender and case outcomes in the criminal realm.51
Stribopoulos and Yahya found that male judges of the Court of Appeal for
Ontario were more likely to overturn a Charter-based acquittal than their female
counterparts.52 Looking at the same data, Hausegger, Riddell, and Hennigar
found that female judges voted more liberally in non-Charter (but not Charter)
criminal cases than male judges.53 In examining provincial appellate decisions
from five provinces from 1982–2008, Songer, Miroslava Radieva, and Rebecca
Reid found that female judges were modestly more likely to vote conservatively
than males in criminal cases.54 Hausegger, McNabb, and Riddell’s examination
of section 24(2) decisions from four provincial appellate courts, however, found
no significant difference between male and female judges.55
Two previous studies examined the effect of professional background on
case outcomes in Canada. Hausegger, Riddell, and Hennigar found that between
50. Songer, Transformation of the Supreme Court, supra note 38 at 206. In contrast, they were
substantially more likely to vote liberally in civil liberties and economic cases (ibid). See also
Johnson, Songer & Jilani, supra note 38 at 249 (female Supreme Court judges voted more
conservatively than males in criminal cases from 1982-2007); Susan W Johnson & Donald
Songer, “Judge Gender and the Voting Behavior of Justices on Two North American Supreme
Courts” (2009) 30 Justice System J 265 at 272-74; Jilani, Songer & Johnson, supra note 39
at 66 (female Supreme Court judges from 1976-2007 voted slightly more conservatively in
criminal Charter cases).
51. Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 9 at 75. See also Songer & Johnson, supra note
38 at 928-29, Table 3 (female-liberalism correlation in civil liberties, but not criminal or
economic cases; no significant correlation between gender and liberalism in Supreme Court
criminal cases from 1978-2000). See also Candace C White, “Gender Differences on the
Supreme Court” in FL Morton, ed, Law, Politics and the Judicial Process in Canada, 3rd ed
(University of Calgary Press, 2002) 85 (female-liberalism correlation in civil liberties and
equality cases but not legal rights claims).
52. Supra note 42 at 356. In domestic and sexual violence cases, however, women voted more
conservatively than men (ibid at 356, 358). Stribopoulos and Yahya also examined the
interaction of appointing party and gender, concluding that the latter has more explanatory
power than the former (ibid at 353, 358). But see Peter McCormick & Twyla Job, “Do
Women Judges Make a Difference? An Analysis of Appeal Court Data” (1993) 8 CJLS 135
(no significant difference between male and female judges in criminal appeals in Alberta).
53. Supra note 43 at 680, 682.
54. “Gender Diversity in the Intermediate Appellate Courts of Canada” (2016) 37 Justice System
J 4 at 12, Table 1.
55. Supra note 4 at 17-18 and Tables 3 and 4.
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1990–2003, former defence lawyers on the Court of Appeal for Ontario voted
more liberally in Charter (but not non-Charter) criminal cases than the average
judge.56 Former prosecutors (of whom there were few in the dataset) did not
vote differently in criminal cases than other judges.57 Hausegger, McNabb, and
Riddell found no difference between former prosecutors and defence lawyers in
section 24(2) cases from four provincial courts of appeal.58
Another possible external influence on judges’ section 24(2) decisions
is location-specific legal culture. Conformity bias may induce judges in some
jurisdictions or courts to be more inclined to exclude unconstitutionally obtained
evidence than in other jurisdictions or courts. There has been little study of this
question in Canada. Songer, Radieva, and Reid found that provincial appellate
judges in British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario voted more conservatively in
criminal cases than in New Brunswick.59 And using Court of Appeal for Ontario
judges as a reference point, Hausegger, McNabb, and Ridell found that British
Columbia appellate judges were more likely to admit and Saskatchewan and
Nova Scotia judges more likely to exclude.60
B. JURISPRUDENCE

The scholarship reviewed above suggests that extra-legal influences on section
24(2) decisions may be limited. In other words, case-specific legalist factors likely
play an important, if not dominant, role in deciding whether unconstitutionally
obtained evidence is excluded. We therefore mined our dataset to tease out the
internal legal correlates of exclusion. To put our findings in context, it is first
necessary to summarize the section 24(2) jurisprudence.
Before the Charter, courts in Canada had no general power to exclude illegally
obtained evidence.61 After its passage in 1982, courts were required to adjudicate
claims of police62 violations of fundamental, constitutionally entrenched
56. Supra note 43 at 683.
57. Ibid at 683-84.
58. Supra note 4 at 18 and Tables 3 and 4. They did find, however, that judges with both
backgrounds were more likely to exclude (ibid).
59. Supra note 54 at 13, Table 2.
60. Supra note 4 at 17 and Tables 3 and 4.
61. See generally A Anne McLellan & Bruce P Elman, “The Enforcement of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An Analysis of Section 24” (1983) 21 Alta L Rev
205 at 225-30.
62. We use “police” throughout this article as shorthand for any state actor, i.e., a person or
entity governed by the Charter as defined in section 32 of that enactment. See generally
Patrick J Monahan, Byron Shaw & Padraic Ryan, Constitutional Law, 5th ed (Irwin Law,
2017) at 427-34.
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procedural norms.63 If claimants establish a violation of one of their own Charter
rights, they may apply for exclusion under section 24(2).64 Under the language
of the provision, claimants must prove that: (1) the evidence was “obtained in
a manner” that violated the Charter; and (2) admission of the evidence would
“bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”65
Very briefly, to satisfy the “obtained in a manner” requirement, the claimant
must show either a sufficiently strong causal connection between the violation
and the acquisition of the evidence or that the two events occurred as part of the
“same transaction or course of conduct.”66 As we will see, this requirement plays
only a minimal role in section 24(2) trial decisions.
The “disrepute” requirement is far more consequential. Early on, the
Supreme Court signaled (to the surprise of many) that exclusion would not be
an extraordinary remedy reserved only for egregious misconduct, but rather one
that would be appropriate at least in cases when the violation was characterized
as “flagrant.”67 In its 1987 decision in R v Collins (“Collins”), the Court
confirmed that section 24(2) represented an “intermediate” position between the
(Canadian) common law’s rejection of illegality as a basis for exclusion and what
it characterized as the “American rule” of automatic exclusion.68 The exclusionary

63. See Charter, supra note 1 (right to be “secure against unreasonable search or seizure,” s 8;
right “not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned,” s 9; right on arrest or detention “to
be informed promptly of the reasons therefor,” s 10(a); and right on arrest or detention to
“retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right,” s 10(b)).
64. Ibid, s 24(2). In rare circumstances exclusion may also be ordered under section 24(1) of
the Charter, which empowers courts to issue any remedy that is “appropriate and just in
the circumstances” (ibid, s (24(1)). This is possible, however, only if the evidence was not
“obtained in a manner” that violated the Charter, for example, when it is the admission of
the evidence at trial that violates the Charter and not the police misconduct associated with
the acquisition of the evidence (ibid, s 24(2)). When the violation is sufficiently connected to
the obtaining of the evidence (in the manner discussed in the text below), the only route to
exclusion is section 24(2). See R v Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38 at paras 3, 19. This study focuses
exclusively on exclusion under s 24(2).
65. Charter, supra note 1, s 24(2).
66. R v Wittwer, 2008 SCC 33 at para 21. See also R v Goldhart, [1996] 2 SCR 463
at paras 32-40.
67. See Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 6th ed (Carswell, 2014) at
636-38. Given the pre-Charter jurisprudence and legislative history of section 24(2), many
expected that the exclusion of evidence would be reserved only for conduct that “shocks the
community.” See McLellan & Elman, supra note 61 at 243-45; Rothman v R, [1981] 1 SCR
640 at 696-97 (Lamer J).
68. R v Collins, [1987] 1 SCR 265 at 280 [Collins].
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decision, it stressed, should be made objectively, in light of “long term community
values” and with deference to the trial judge’s decision on appeal.69
Writing for the majority, Justice Lamer grouped the case-specific factors
relevant to gauging disrepute into three categories: (1) those affecting the “fairness
of the trial”; (2) those bearing on the “seriousness of the violation”; and (3) those
bearing on exclusion’s effect on the repute of the justice system, including the
importance of the evidence and the seriousness of the offence.70 The fairness of
the trial would be compromised, he asserted, by admitting a confession or other
self-incriminating evidence, including bodily samples taken to gauge alcohol
concentrations for those charged with impaired driving offences.71 Subject to a
consideration of the other factors, such evidence “generally should be excluded.”72
Collins was refined and consolidated a decade later in R v Stillman
(“Stillman”).73 There, the Court confirmed that evidence affecting trial fairness
is subject to a strong exclusionary presumption.74 Such evidence was defined as
evidence that is both “conscriptive” (statements of the accused, compelled bodily
evidence, and physical evidence derived therefrom) and non-discoverable (not
obtainable by legal means).75 As in Collins, the fate of evidence not affecting
trial fairness was to be determined by balancing the seriousness of the violation
(on the one hand) against the seriousness of the offence and importance of the
evidence to the prosecution (on the other).76

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Ibid at 281-83.
Ibid at 284-85.
Ibid at 284.
Ibid at 284-85.
[1997] 1 SCR 607 [Stillman].
Ibid at para 72. See also R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at para 64 [Grant] (noting that courts
had generally interpreted Stillman “as creating an all-but-automatic exclusionary rule for
non-discoverable conscriptive evidence”).
75. Stillman, supra note 73 at paras 80-119.
76. See David M Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 7th ed (Irwin Law,
2015) at 405-06.
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The Collins/Stillman framework was subject to withering academic77
(and even judicial)78 criticism and in 2009 the Court changed course. In R v
Grant (“Grant”) it jettisoned the “trial fairness” category and instructed judges
to consider and balance the following categories of factors: (1) “the seriousness
of the Charter-infringing state conduct”; (2) “the impact of the breach on the
Charter-protected interests of the accused”; and (3) “society’s interest in the
adjudication of the case on its merits.”79
Under the first category, the court’s task is to gauge the state’s culpability
along a spectrum ranging from inadvertent, reasonable errors to deliberate
wrongdoing.80 In recent years, the Court has consistently characterized inadvertent
but negligent errors as serious, thus militating in favour of excluding evidence.81
Reasonable mistakes made under conditions of legal uncertainty, in contrast, are
viewed as less serious and favour admitting evidence.82
The second factor is measured by gauging the extent to which the violation
infringed on protected interests, such as privacy for section 8 claims or liberty
under section 9.83 Proving that the evidence would have been legally discovered

77. See e.g. David M Paciocco, “The Judicial Repeal of s. 24(2) and the Development of the
Canadian Exclusionary Rule” (1990) 32 Crim LQ 326 at 338-39; David M Paciocco,
“Stillman, Disproportion and the Fair Trial Dichotomy under Section 24(2)” (1997) 2 Can
Crim L Rev 163; Richard Mahoney, “Problems with the Current Approach to s. 24(2) of
the Charter: An Inevitable Discovery” (1999) 42 Crim LQ 443; Don Stuart, Charter Justice
in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed (Thomson Carswell, 2005) at 566-76, 578-82; Steven
Penney, “Taking Deterrence Seriously: Excluding Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence
Under Section 24(2) of the Charter” (2004) 49 McGill LJ 105 at 129-33.
78. See e.g. R v Grant (2006), 81 OR (3d) 1 at paras 47, 49-50 (Ont CA), rev’d in part 2009
SCC 32. This decision was reversed on other grounds in 2009. See Grant, supra note 74;
R v Dolynchuk (E.N.), 2004 MBCA 45 at paras 47-48; R v Richfield (2003), 178 CCC (3d)
23 at para 18 (Ont CA); R v Janzen, 2006 SKCA 111 at para 7; R v Lotozky, (2006) 81 OR
(3d) 335 at para 44 (Ont CA). See also R v Orbanski; R v Elias [2005] 2 SCR 37 at paras
87, 92-93 (LeBel J, dissenting in Elias).
79. Grant, supra note 74 at para 71.
80. Ibid at paras 72-74. See also Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos,
Criminal Procedure in Canada, 2nd ed (LexisNexis, 2018) at ss 10.107-119.
81. See e.g. Harrison, supra note 2 at para 22; R v Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 at paras 100-103
[Morelli]; R v Le, 2019 SCC 34 at para 147 [Le].
82. See e.g. R v Cole, 2012 SCC 53 at para 86 [Cole]; R v Aucoin, 2012 SCC 66 at para 50
[Aucoin]; R v Fearon, 2014 SCC 77 at paras 92-94 [Fearon]; R v Vu, 2013 SCC 60 at paras
69-71; Grant, supra note 74 at paras 133, 140.
83. Grant, supra note 74 at paras 78, 109, 113-14; Le, supra note 80 at paras 153-54.
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without the violation, however, may diminish its effect on the relevant interest
and weigh in favour of admission.84
Under the third factor, courts consider the evidence’s reliability and
importance to the prosecution’s case as well as the seriousness of the offence.85
Reliable and important evidence is more likely to be admitted (and vice versa).86
Offence seriousness, however, may “cut both ways.”87 “[W]hile the public has a
heightened interest in seeing a determination on the merits where the offence
charged is serious,” the Court asserted, “it also has a vital interest in having a
justice system that is above reproach, particularly where the penal stakes for
the accused are high.”88 As it had in Collins,89 the Court in Grant stressed that
the purpose of excluding evidence is to dissociate the courts from unacceptable
state misconduct and maintain long-term public confidence in the criminal
justice system.90

84. Ibid at para 122. See also R v Nolet, 2010 SCC 24 at para 54; R v Côté, 2011 SCC 46
at paras 72, 84 [Côté] (the fact that police had probable grounds to search attenuated the
impact of the violation caused by failure to obtain a warrant); Cole, supra note 82 at para 93
(same); Fearon, supra note 82 at para 96 (same).
85. Grant, supra note 74 at paras 80-83. Note that the reliability criterion relates only to
reliability concerns arising from Charter violations (e.g., when an accused confesses without
having been properly afforded the right to counsel). See Fearon, supra note 82 at para 194
(Karakatsanis J dissenting).
86. Grant, supra note 74 at paras 81-83.
87. Ibid at para 84.
88. Ibid. The Court’s treatment of offence seriousness post-Grant is difficult to characterize.
In some cases, it has either ignored the factor or characterized its net effect as being roughly
neutral. See Morelli, supra note 81 at para 107; Côté, supra note 84 at paras 47-48, 53-56;
Aucoin, supra note 82 at para 51; Cole, supra note 82 at para 96; Fearon, supra note 82
at para 97; R v Taylor, 2014 SCC 50 at para 37; R v MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50 at paras
134-35. In others, it has seemingly counted an offence’s relative seriousness as weighing
(at least somewhat) in favour of admission. See R v Spencer, 2014 SCC 43 at paras 79-80
(“Society undoubtedly has an interest in seeing a full and fair trial based on reliable evidence,
and all the more so for a crime which implicates the safety of children” at para 80); R v Mian,
2014 SCC 54 at para 88 [Mian] (noting uncritically that the trial judge considered offence
seriousness as favouring admission); Harrison, supra note 2 at paras 34-35 (noting that
while offence seriousness “must not take on disproportionate significance,” the “very serious
charge…weighs in favour of admission” at paras 34-35).
89. Supra note 68 at 281 (the purpose of excluding evidence is to prevent further disrepute
occasioned by “admission of evidence that would deprive the accused of a fair hearing,
or from judicial condonation of unacceptable conduct by the investigatory and
prosecutorial agencies”).
90. Supra note 74 at paras 68-72. See also Le, supra note 81 at para 140; Morelli, supra note
81 at para 108.
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While the Court stressed in Grant that the three factors must be balanced
without the benefit of any “overarching rule,”91 some general guidelines have
emerged. First, the Court in Grant pronounced a “presumptive” but “not
automatic” rule that statements obtained from the accused through a Charter
violation should be excluded.92 The Court reasoned that Charter breaches
producing statements are often serious; the self-incrimination interests harmed
by such violations are particularly “fundamental,” and improper questioning
often results in unreliable confessions.93 Unconstitutionally obtained statements
could be admitted, however, when these generalizations did not apply.94
The Court stressed, however, that compelled bodily samples are not subject
to the same exclusionary presumption.95 Indeed, it hinted that breath samples
collected in impaired driving investigations would often be admitted because
“the method of collection is relatively non-intrusive.”96 In the years since Grant,
however, many lower courts have attempted to qualify this dictum, noting that
the Charter violations arising in impaired driving cases often involve significant
intrusions on liberty.97
Lastly, the Court has recently stated that excluding evidence may be
warranted even where only one of the three factors pulls in that direction.98
It is possible, the Court stated in R v Le, “that serious Charter-infringing conduct,
even when coupled with a weak impact on the Charter-protected interest, will on
its own support a finding that admission of tainted evidence would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.”99 And where both of the first two
categories strongly favour exclusion of evidence, “the third inquiry will seldom

91. Grant, supra note 73 at para 86. See also Harrison, supra note 2 at para 36 (the Grant test
is “qualitative” and “not capable of mathematical precision”); Mian, supra note 87 at para
88 (characterizing the Grant test as “flexible and imprecise balancing exercise”); Côté, supra
note 83 at para 48 (“No one consideration should be permitted to consistently trump other
considerations”).
92. Supra note 73 at para 92.
93. Ibid at paras 93-98.
94. Ibid at para 96.
95. Ibid at paras 99-111.
96. Ibid at para 111.
97. See e.g. R v Bagherli (A), 2014 MBCA 105 at paras 76-79; R v Spin, 2014 NSCA 1 at paras
60-79; R v Cullen, 2015 SKCA 142 at paras 53-55. See also Don Stuart, Charter Justice
in Canadian Criminal Law, 6th ed (Carswell, 2014) at 664-65. But see R v Jennings, 2018
ONCA 260 at paras 27-29 (stressing minimal intrusiveness of the breath sampling process as
limiting the impact of a section 8 breach on the accused’s Charter-protected interests).
98. Le, supra note 81 at para 141.
99. Ibid [emphasis in original].
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if ever tip the balance in favour of admissibility.”100 Conversely, “if the first two
inquiries together reveal weaker support for exclusion of the evidence, the third
inquiry will most often confirm that the administration of justice would not be
brought into disrepute by admitting the evidence.”101

II. DATA & METHODS
To gauge the influence of both the legal and extra-legal variables on section 24(2)
decisions, we compiled an original dataset of all trial decisions (provincial and
superior trial court) obtained from the Canadian Legal Information Institute
(CANLII) database decided between 1 January 2013–31 December 2018.102
We excluded cases in which judges either did not find a Charter violation or
found that the evidence sought to be excluded was not “obtained in a manner”
that infringed the Charter.103
The details of our coding procedure may be found online.104 The key external
variables were the judge’s gender, party of appointment, professional background,
court level, and provincial and territorial jurisdiction. The key internal variables
were the accused’s gender along with the suite of factors identified in Grant as
guiding the exclusionary decision. To test for changes wrought by that decision,
we also compiled a sample of cases from 2007, two years before Grant.

100. Ibid at para 142. See also R v Paterson, 2017 SCC 15 at para 56 [Paterson]; R v McGuffie,
2016 ONCA 365 at para 62-63; Stevens c R, 2016 QCCA 1707 at paras 89-90.
101. Le, supra note 81 at para 142.
102. The dataset is available online. See “Penney & Yahya 24(2) Datasets,” online: <bit.
ly/2BPF5wF>; for the details of our coding procedure, see “Codebook” (2020), online: <bit.
ly/2EIprEr> [“Codebook”]. Additionally, see generally Mark A Hall & Ronald F Wright,
“Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions” (2008) 96 Cal L Rev 63 at 100-16.
103. In many of these cases, judges went on to conduct a full section 24(2) inquiry for the
purposes of potential appellate review. In none of these cases did the judge conclude that,
had there been a violation, the evidence would have been excluded. This suggests that the
practice of conducting an “in the alternative” section 24(2) assessment serves no purpose and
that no appellate deference should be given to trial judges’ exclusionary assessments when
they did not find that evidence was obtained in a manner that violated the Charter. See Le,
supra note 81 at para 138; Paterson, supra note 100 at para 42.
104. See “Codebook,” supra note 101.
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III. FINDINGS
A. DATASET CHARACTERISTICS

Our main dataset (2013–2018) contains 1,472 observations.105 The breakdown
of the cases by level of court can be seen in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY COURT LEVEL
Level of court

Number

Percent

Provincial

938

63.7

Superior

534

36.3

Total

1,472

100

As seen in Table 2, below, most of the observations came from Alberta, British
Columbia, Saskatchewan, Quebec, and Ontario. Ontario decisions comprised
almost half (46%) of all observations.
TABLE 2: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY PROVINCE
Province

Number

Percent

AB

165

11.21

BC

128

8.7

MB

33

2.24

NB

10

0.68

NL

36

2.45

NS

31

2.11

NT

8

0.54

NU

3

0.2

ON

678

46.06

PE

1

0.07

105. The number of reported “exclusionary decisions” in our dataset (1,472) is greater than
the number of reported cases, i.e., decisions with unique citations (1,327). As explained
in greater detail in the “Codebook,” supra note 102, we coded judges as making multiple
exclusionary decisions in a single case if they either: (1) considered the admissibility of both a
statement of the accused and any other kind of evidence; or (2) for non-statement evidence,
dealt with more than one type of evidence and treated them differently in the Grant analysis.
All statistical analyses are based on “exclusionary decisions.”
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TABLE 2: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY PROVINCE
QC

256

17.39

SK

108

7.34

YT

15

1.02

Total

1,472

100

In terms of judicial characteristics, one quarter of cases were adjudicated by
female judges.106 Former prosecutors decided 27% of the cases, 30% were
decided by former criminal defence counsel, and the remainder were decided by
judges with non-criminal practice backgrounds.107 Forty-one percent of the cases
were decided by judges appointed by conservative governments, 43% by liberal
governments, and 16% by social democratic governments.108 This can all be seen
in Table 3, below.
TABLE 3: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY JUDGE’S BACKGROUND, PARTY OF
APPOINTMENT, AND GENDER
Number

Percent

Crown

393

26.7

Defence

456

31.0

Other

623

42.3

Total

1,472

100

Conservative

596

40.5

Liberal

635

43.2

N/A

9

0.6

Social Democrat

230

15.7

Total

1,470109

100

106. Note that there is greater gender balance in the superior courts (30% of judges being
female) than provincial courts (23%). Overall, the percentage of female judges increased
(non-linearly) between 2013 (20%) and 2018 (26%).
107. In the provincial courts, 28% of judges were former prosecutors, 38% were former defence
counsel, and 33% were non-criminal lawyers. In the superior courts, 24% were former
Crown counsel, 18% were former defence counsel, and 58% were non-criminal lawyers.
108. Our partisan-political classification methodology is described in detail in the “Codebook,”
supra note 102. The number of liberal appointees increased over time (from 34% in 2013 to
57% in 2018) while the number of conservative (47% to 35%) and social democratic (19%
to 7%) appointees decreased.
109. In two instances, we were not able to determine the judge’s party of appointment.
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TABLE 3: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY JUDGE’S BACKGROUND, PARTY OF
APPOINTMENT, AND GENDER
Female

373

25.3

Male

1,099

74.7

Total

1,472

100

All superior courts judges were appointed by either conservative or liberal
governments. Sixty-three percent of superior court decisions were made by
conservative-appointed judges, with the remaining 37% by liberal appointees. The
party of appointment proportions for provincial court were 28% conservative,
47% liberal, and 25% social democratic. The distribution of judges by party of
appointment across the two court levels is shown in Table 4, below.
TABLE 4: JUDGES’ PARTY OF APPOINTMENT BY LEVEL OF COURT. PERCENT IS
EQUAL TO THE PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF JUDGES FROM EACH
POLITICAL PARTY CATEGORY IN EACH COURT LEVEL
Conservative

Liberal

N/A

Social
Democrat

Total

Number

260

438

8

230

936

Percent

43.6

69.0

88.9

100

63.7

Number

336

197

1

0

534

Percent

56.4

31.0

11.1

0

36.3

596

635

9

230

1,470

Court
Provincial

Superior

Total

B. OVERALL EXCLUSION RATE

The exclusion rate in our dataset was 70.4%; that is, in 1,472 reported
exclusionary decisions from 2013–2018, trial judges who found that evidence
was obtained in a manner that violated the Charter excluded at least some of
the evidence in just over seven in ten instances. This figure is broadly consistent
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with the exclusion rate found in other studies.110 As illustrated in Table 5 below,
the exclusion rate was highest in 2014 (73.52%) and lowest in 2017 (68.37%).
While no clear secular trend emerged from this period, in no year was the rate
as high as that found in our sample of 2007 trial decisions (75%). While this
offers some support for the hypothesis that the Court’s 2009 decision in Grant
modestly diminished the frequency of excluding evidence, the difference between
the mean 2013–2018 rate and the 2007 rate is not statistically significant.111
TABLE 5: NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF EXCLUSIONS BY YEAR
2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Total

Number

144

161

159

178

227

167

1,036

Percent

72.7

73.5

68.2

72.4

68.4

68.4

70.4

Like the datasets in other studies, our dataset includes only “reported”
or “published” decisions, i.e., those available on online databases.112 More than
110. See Madden, “Marshalling,” supra note 3, Table 1 (70% exclusion rate for 100 cases reported
in English in 2010, including some appeal decisions); Nadon, supra note 3 (69% exclusion
rate for 45 Quebec trial decisions from 2009-2011); Asselin, “Trends,” supra note 3, Table
1(a) (73% exclusion rate for 98 trial decisions in 2012), Table 8 (67% exclusion rate for
1,236 trial decisions from 2009-2014); Johnson, Jochelson & Weir, supra note 3, Table 2
(75% exclusion rate for 600 trial decisions from 2014-2017); Patrick McGuinty, “Section
24(2) of the Charter; Exploring the Role of Police Conduct in the Grant Analysis” (2018)
41 Man LJ 273 at 288 (67% exclusion rate for 100 cases from 2016, including some appeal
decisions). Madden generously shared his dataset with us. We adapted it for our purposes by
deleting appeal decisions and including every reported case (in English or French) from 2010
that we could find that was not initially included. For this adjusted dataset, the exclusion
rate was 68% (76 out of 111). We also deleted the appeal decisions and decisions where no
breach was found from the 2016 McGuinty dataset, finding an adjusted exclusion rate of
71% (52 out of 73).
111. The t-statistic is 1.15, which is not significant at a level of 5% or 10%. See also Hausegger,
McNabb & Riddell, supra note 4 at 14-16 and Table 4 (noting significant decline in
post-Grant exclusion rate in court of appeal decisions from four provinces).
112. Trial judges are generally thought to publish when they think that their reasons would have
significant precedential or jurisprudential value. See Denise M Keele et al, “An Analysis
of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions” (2009) 6 J
Empirical Leg Stud 213 at 214; Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J Schwab, “What Shapes
Perceptions of the Federal Court System?” (1989) 56 U Chicago L Rev 501 at 535; Peter
Siegelman & John J Donohue III, “Studying the Iceberg from its Tip: A Comparison of
Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases” (1990) 24 Law & Soc’y
Rev 1133 at 1149-50. Decisions to publish may be influenced by other factors, however,
such as individual judges’ preferences for writing, willingness to work, desire for promotion,
and other idiosyncratic factors. See Karen Swenson, “Federal District Court Judges and the
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half113 of section 24(2) trial decisions are not reported and there is (to our
knowledge) no efficient means of collecting (or even scientifically sampling) these
decisions. As a result, we cannot state that our findings are representative of all
trial decisions.114
Though this is a substantial caveat, it is far from fatal. First, inasmuch as
our analyses reveal meaningful patterns in ways that section 24(2) is applied in
reported decisions, our understanding of the jurisprudence is enhanced beyond
what would be achievable through traditional, ad hoc appellate case analysis.115
To the extent that judges are influenced by other judges’ decisions, that influence
comes predominantly from reported reasons.
Second, it is possible to get at least some sense of the extent to which reported
section 24(2) cases are representative of all such cases.116 We collected all reported
appeal decisions for 2013 and 2018 where a trial judge’s section 24(2) decision
was challenged on appeal (n=133).117 Assuming that reported and unreported
trial decisions are appealed with the same frequency and distribution,118 we can
test for differences between the two types of cases.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

118.

Decision to Publish” (2004) 25 Justice System J 121 at 123-28. In addition, courts may have
differing practices and norms associated with publication. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra
note 112 at 1144.
We explain how we estimated this proportion below.
See generally Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 112; Keele et al, supra note 112; Eisenberg
& Schwab, supra note 112 at 535.
See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 112 at 1136, n 9.
For similar methodologies, see Donald R Songer, “Nonpublication in the United States
District Courts: Official Criteria Versus Inferences from Appellate Review” (1988) 50 J
Politics 206 at 208; Swenson, supra note 112 at 129-31.
This includes appeals of both summary conviction offences (heard by a judge of the
provincial superior trial court) and indictable offences (heard by a panel of the court of
appeal). The vast majority of appeal decisions involving section 24(2) of the Charter are
themselves reported, so there is negligible risk of selection bias for these cases. To confirm
this assumption, we first examined all Supreme Court of Canada decisions from 2013–2018
where a section 24(2) determination was made at some point in the proceedings (n=20).
In every case, the decision from the court of appeal below was reported. We also collected
all court of appeal decisions constituting appeals of summary conviction appeal dispositions
from the same period and found that 23 of 25 (92%) of the decisions below (i.e., the initial
summary conviction appeal) were reported.
This assumption is not unassailable as the decision to appeal is made by the parties, not
by researchers selecting a representative random sample. See Keele et al, supra note 112 at
221; Swenson, supra note 112 at 129. We cannot think of reasons for any major systemic
differences, however, between reported and unreported cases in relation to the decision
to appeal trial judges’ section 24(2) rulings. See generally ibid at 130 (finding only minor
differences between appealed and un-appealed US district court decisions).
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Of the reported trial decisions appealed (n=58, 44% of cases), the exclusion
rate was 55% at trial; for unreported cases (n=75, 56% of cases), it was 41%.
Both rates are substantially lower than the rate for all reported trial decisions
in our sample (70%). This is to be expected, since defendants are much more
likely to appeal the admission of evidence than the prosecution is to appeal
its exclusion.119 The difference between the exclusion rates for reported and
unreported cases appealed tells us, however, that a judge who excludes evidence
is more likely to publish reasons for the decision than a judge who admits.120
This could be because exclusion induces writing, because judges who write
more are more exclusionary, or a combination of these factors. This finding is
consistent with previous research which shows that when there are ideological
differences between published and un-published decisions, the former is more
liberal than the latter.121
In any case, the data suggest that that actual exclusion rate (for reported and
unreported cases together) is closer to 60% than the 70.4% rate for reported
decisions. While this difference is substantial,122 it is not huge. While it does signal
a need for caution in extrapolating from reported to all decisions, it does not
suggest that findings from the former are wholly unrepresentative of the latter.123

119. See generally Cross, supra note 9 at 134-35.
120. The difference between the two means is statistically insignificant at the 10% level, possibly
due to the small sample size. We note that at the 12% level of significance, the difference
would have been significant.
121. See CK Rowland & Robert A Carp, Politics and Judgment in Federal District Courts
(University Press of Kansas, 1996) at 126-27 (criminal cases in federal district courts in three
cities); Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 112 at 1155-56 (federal courts in employment
discrimination cases); Keith Carlson, Michael A Livermore & Daniel N Rockmore, “The
Problem of Data Bias in the Pool of Published U.S. Appellate Court Opinions” (2020) 17
J Empirical Leg Stud 224 (computational modeling of various publication effects in federal
circuit courts).
122. We derived this estimate by using the number of cases in the appeal sample to infer the
number of unreported trial judgments that would exist to match what we collected. Given
that there were seventy-five unreported trial decisions and fifty-eight reported, we infer
that there would be 1472 x (75/58) = 1903 corresponding unreported cases in our sample.
Given that the relative exclusion rate in the appellate sample was 41%/55% = 74.5%, this
implies that the exclusion rate for the 1,903 unreported cases would be 74.5% x 70.4%
= 52.4%. As such, the total exclusion rate will be (70.4% x 1472 + 52.4% x 1903)/
(1472+1903) = 60.3%.
123. See Keele et al, supra note 112 at 230, 233 (no ideological differences between published and
unpublished decisions in federal district courts).
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C. EXTERNAL VARIABLES
1.

SUPERIOR VERSUS PROVINCIAL COURTS

As seen in Table 6, below, provincial court judges were more likely to exclude
evidence (74%) than superior court judges (65%).124 The difference is
statistically significant.125
TABLE 6: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY LEVEL OF COURT
Provincial

Superior

Number

691

345

Rate

73.7

64.6

This difference in exclusion rates could be explained either by differences between
the judges appointed to the two levels of court or differences between the types
of cases that they hear. We examine the question of judicial characteristics in this
section and case characteristics in the next.
2.

JUDGES’ GENDER

Table 7, below, shows that gender differences were small and statistically
insignificant, both overall and within each court level.126
TABLE 7: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY LEVEL OF COURT
AND JUDGE’S GENDER
Provincial

Superior

Combined

Male
Number
Rate

533
73.7

242
64.4

775
70.5

Female
Number
Rate

158
73.5

103
65.2

261
70.0

Total
Number
Rate

691
73.7

345
64.6

1036
70.4

124. See also Johnson, Jochelson & Weir, supra note 3, Table 15 (reporting a higher exclusion
rate at trial for provincial courts, 74%, than superior courts, 62%); Jochelson, Huang &
Murchison, supra note 3, Table 8 (reporting a 70% exclusion rate for provincial trial courts;
62% for superior trial courts).
125. The t-statistic is -3.67, which is significant at the 5% level.
126. The t-statistic for provincial courts is 0.07; for superior courts, it is 0.19; for both combined
it is 0.2. None of these results is significant at a level of 5% or 10%.
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3.

PARTY OF APPOINTMENT

The exclusion rates for ideology (as measured by party of appointment) are
depicted in Table 8. The combined exclusion rates for both levels of court are
69.8% for liberal appointees, 68.3% for conservative appointees, and 77.0% for
social democratic appointees. The difference between conservative and liberal
appointees is very small and statistically insignificant.127 The social democratic
exclusion rate, however, is significantly higher.128
TABLE 8: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION AND ADMISSION BY LEVEL OF
COURT AND JUDGE’S PARTY OF APPOINTMENT
Provincial

Superior

Combined

Liberal
Number
Rate

317
72.4

126
64.0

443
69.8

Conservative
Number
Rate

188
72.3

219
65.2

407
68.3

Social Democrat
Number
Rate

177
77.0

n/a
n/a

177
77.0

N/A
Number
Rate

8
100

0
0

8
88.9

Total
Number
Rate

690
73.7

345
64.6

1035
70.4

In addition to the three-way comparison discussed immediately above,
we also conducted a two-way comparison, classifying each judge as either

127. The t-statistic for the difference between conservative and liberal exclusion rates in all courts
was 0.57, which was statistically insignificant at the 5% and 10% levels. For the difference
between liberals and conservatives on the superior courts, the t-statistic was 0.3, and for the
differences between liberals and conservatives on the provincial courts, the t-statistic was
0.02. Both are also statistically insignificant at the 5% and 10% levels.
128. The t-statistic for social democratic judges versus liberal and conservative judges combined is
2.42; for social democratic judges versus liberal judges, it is 2.05; for social democratic judges
versus conservative judges, it is 2.45. Each result is significant at the 5% level.
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“liberal” or “conservative.”129 This did not yield any significant differences in
exclusion rates.130
4.

JUDGES’ PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Another possible source of difference is the judges’ pre-appointment background.
Table 9, below, displays the exclusion rates by court level and professional
background. For both levels of court combined, former criminal defence lawyers
excluded evidence 76% of the time, Crown prosecutors 64%, and non-criminal
lawyers 71%. Each of these differences is statistically significant.131
TABLE 9: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY LEVEL OF COURT AND
JUDGE’S PRE-APPOINTMENT BACKGROUND

5.

Provincial

Superior

Combined

Defence
Number
Rate

277
76.9

69
72.0

346
75.9

Non-criminal
Number
Rate

238
76.5

201
64.4

439
70.5

Crown
Number
Rate

176
65.9

75
59.5

251
63.9

Total
Number
Rate

691
73.7

345
64.6

1036
70.4

JURISDICTION

As shown in Table 10, below, we also found substantial differences between
jurisdictions. The exclusion rate was higher than the national average in Quebec
129. For this comparison we classified a judge as “liberal” if his or her party of appointment was
situated to the ideological left of the contemporary opposition party, and vice-versa. This is
explained in further detail in the “Codebook,” supra note 102.
130. In the provincial courts, the exclusion rate for conservative judges was 73.3%; for liberal
judges, it was 73.6%, a statistically insignificant difference (t-statistic of 0.09). In the superior
courts, the exclusion rate was 64.0% for liberal appointees and 65.1% for conservative ones,
which is also a statistically insignificant difference (t-statistic of 0.30).
131. The t-statistic for defence versus Crown is 3.84 (significant at 5%); for non-criminal
versus Crown, it is 2.25 (significant at 5%); for non-criminal versus defence, it is 1.93
(significant at 10%).
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and British Columbia and substantially lower in Alberta.132 Of the remaining
jurisdictions with more than 100 cases each, Ontario showed a modestly higher
admission rate and Saskatchewan a modestly lower one. Rates for the remaining
provinces are reported in Table 11, below.
TABLE 10: EXCLUSION RATE BY PROVINCES (WITH >100 OBSERVATIONS)
AB

BC

ON

QC

SK

Number

165

128

678

256

108

Rate

63.6

73.4

67.6

77.0

71.3

TABLE 11: EXCLUSION RATE BY PROVINCES (WITH <100 OBSERVATIONS)
MB

NB

NL

NS

NT

NU

PEI

YT

Rate

33

10

36

31

8

3

1

15

Number

69.7

40.0

83.3

87.1

100

33.3

100

73.3

6.

PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES

A note at this point is warranted regarding how to interpret our results. One
way to interpret them is to think of them as conditional rates, which means
that a given exclusion rate is a function of what information we possess. For
example, knowing a judge’s gender would not enhance our ability to predict
whether unconstitutionally obtained evidence would be excluded. Nor would
knowing that the judge was a conservative or liberal appointee. So far, the
variables that appear predictive are court level, professional background, and
jurisdiction. As we proceed, we will condition the odds of exclusion on more
than two variables, such as whether the judge is a male who was a prosecutor
prior to his appointment who now sits on a superior court.
Consider first the combination of court level and party of appointment.
We know that the exclusion rate is higher for both social democratic appointees
(compared to liberals and conservatives) and provincial court judges (compared to
superior court judges). However, we also know that social democrats are present
132. Among these five provinces, pairwise tests of differences are significant at the 5% level for
BC versus Alberta, Quebec versus Alberta, and Quebec versus Ontario. See also Johnson,
Jochelson & Weir, supra note 3, Table 3 (substantially lower than average exclusion rate for
Alberta; substantially higher rates for British Columbia and Quebec).
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only on the provincial courts. Could this help explain the higher exclusion rate
in provincial court?
The answer appears to be no. While social democratic appointees in
the provincial courts do exclude evidence more frequently than liberals or
conservatives, the differences are not statistically significant.133 Further, when
we compare the exclusion rate of liberal and conservative appointees, we see an
almost identical rate in provincial courts (72%) and a statistically insignificant
1.2% difference in superior courts (64.0% for liberal appointees and 65.2%
for conservative appointees).134 This suggests that liberal and conservative
appointees vote similarly regardless of court level. Overall, party of appointment
does not appear to explain the difference between provincial and superior court
exclusion rates.
Now consider the interaction between court level and professional
background. As seen in Table 9, above, provincial court judges with criminal
defence or non-criminal practice backgrounds excluded evidence at a virtually
identical rate (76.9% versus 76.5%).135 Judges who were prosecutors, however,
had an exclusion rate of 65.9%, a full 11 percentage points lower than the other
two categories.136
In the superior courts, the exclusion rates were 71.9% for criminal defence,
59.5% for prosecution, and 64.4% for non-criminal practice backgrounds.
However, only the defence and prosecution rates were significantly different
from each other.137 There was no statistically significant difference between
non-criminal lawyers and defence or Crown lawyers, individually or combined.138
In the superior courts, knowing that a judge had a non-criminal practice is not
predictive of exclusion, but knowing that a judge had been a prosecutor or
criminal defence lawyer is.
133. The t-statistic for social democrats versus liberals and conservatives combined is 1.33; for
social democrat versus liberal, it is 1.24; and for social democrat versus conservative it is 1.13.
None is significant at the 5% or 10% level.
134. The t-statistic for liberal versus conservative in provincial court is 0.02 (not significant
at the 5% or 10% level); for liberal versus conservative in superior court, it is 0.30 (not
significant at 5% or 10%).
135. The t-statistic for defence versus non-criminal is 0.12 (not significant at the
5% or 10% level).
136. The t-statistic for Crown versus defence is 3.01 (significant at the 5% level); for Crown versus
non-criminal, it is 2.81 (significant at the 5% level).
137. The t-statistic for defence versus Crown is 2.01 (significant at the 5% level).
138. The t-statistic for Crown versus non-criminal Crown lawyers is 1.02 (not significant at the
5% or 10% level); for non-criminal versus defence lawyers, it is 1.41 (not significant at 5%
or 10%); for non-criminal versus Crown and defence lawyers combined in provincial court,
it is 1.36 (not significant at 5% or 10%); for non-criminal versus Crown and defence lawyers
combined in superior court, it is 0.11 (not significant at 5% or 10%).
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What happens when we add gender to the mix? Not much. The strongest
predictor of exclusion rates continues to be professional background. Table
12, below, shows the exclusion rates in the two levels of court conditional on
judges’ gender and professional background. More patterns have emerged now
that there are twelve ways to categorize the judges. By testing every possible
two-way combination within each level of court, we can see which judicial
characteristics correlate with statistically significant differences in exclusion rates.
In the provincial courts, male judges with criminal defence backgrounds exclude
evidence more frequently than former prosecutors of either gender. Similarly,
in provincial courts, judges with non-criminal backgrounds exclude evidence at
a higher rate than prosecutors regardless of gender.
In the superior courts, male criminal defence lawyers were more likely to
exclude evidence than male prosecutors.139 There were additional significant
differences between various subcategories across the levels of court. We do not
address those here. The overall finding is that professional background appears to
make a substantial difference in provincial courts and a lesser (but still significant)
difference in the superior courts.
TABLE 12: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION LEVEL OF COURT, JUDGES’
GENDER, AND JUDGES’ BACKGROUND
Provincial
Male
Female
Total

Superior

Crown

Defence

Other

Crown

Defence

Other

Number

170

307

246

100

76

200

Rate

65.9

76.9

75.2

59.0

71.1

64.5

97

53

65

26

20

112

Rate

66.0

77.7

81.5

61.5

75.0

64.3

Number

267

360

311

126

96

312

Rate

65.9

76.9

76.5

59.5

71.9

64.4

Number

We also examined exclusion rates conditional on gender and party of
appointment. Although there were differences in the superior courts, none is
statistically significant.140 In provincial court, in contrast, the following pairwise
comparisons are significant (with the group on the left more likely to exclude
than that on the right):141
139. See “Appendix,” Part VI, below, Table A.
140. See “Appendix,” Part VI, below, Table B.
141. See “Appendix,” Part VI, below, Table C.
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•
•
•
•

Female social democrats > female liberals;
Male social democrats > female liberals;
Male liberals > female liberals; and
Female conservatives > female liberals.

What stands out most here, perhaps counterintuitively, is that female judges
appointed by liberal provincial governments are less likely to exclude evidence
than any other party–gender combination.
We also examined exclusion rates conditional on professional background
and party of appointment.142 In the superior courts, the only statistically
significant finding is that conservative defence lawyers excluded evidence more
often than conservative prosecutors. We found more significant differences in the
provincial courts as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

liberal non-criminal > social democratic Crown;
conservative non-criminal > liberal Crowns;
social democratic defence > conservative Crown;
social democrats non-criminal > social democratic Crown;
social democratic defence > social democratic Crown;
liberal non-criminal > liberal Crown;
social democratic other > liberal Crown;
liberal defence > liberal Crown; and
social democratic defence > liberal Crown.143

This suggests that at the provincial level, judges’ professional background is
a weighty factor, with a prosecutorial experience mattering most. Party of
appointment matters in some instances, but not to the same degree.
While the results reported in Tables 12–14 highlight differences within the
provincial courts, there are also significant differences between the exclusion rates
of provincial and superior courts across the categories of gender, background,
and party of appointment. Significant differences also arise when jurisdiction is
considered. We do not report these findings, however, as analyzing each possible
two-way combination would be unduly lengthy. Instead, as detailed in the next
section, we apply a multivariate analysis to gauge the marginal impact of each
external variable on the exclusionary decision.

142. See “Appendix,” Part VI, below, Table D.
143. See “Appendix,” Part VI, below, Table E.
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7.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Our logistical regression model takes the decision to admit or exclude evidence
as the dependent or “explained” outcome.144 We then control for each identified
variable to measure its significance on the exclusionary decision.
Tables 15–18 below display the base outcome as “exclude,” so the measure of
each independent or “explanatory” variable shows whether it is more likely to result
in admission. The first column displays the explanatory variables: judges’ gender
(with female as the starting point); judges’ pre-appointment background (with
Crown as the starting point); and judges’ party of appointment (with conservative
as the starting point). The constant reported at the bottom is the model’s starting
point, i.e., a female prosecutor appointed by a conservative government.
The result for each explanatory variable is reported in the second column in
the “relative odds” format with its associated p-value in the third column.145 For
example, consider the constant shown in Table 15 below: a female, conservative
Crown. The strict interpretation of the 0.61 odds ratio for that judge is that the
ratio of admission to exclusion is 61%, i.e., the odds that she will admit the
evidence are 61% relative to the likelihood that she will exclude it. Such a judge
would admit the evidence 38% of the time and exclude it 62% of the time.146
What emerges from Table 15 is that former criminal defence lawyers and
former non-criminal lawyers are even less likely than the baseline judge to admit
the evidence. For example, the odds for a female liberal defence counsel can be
calculated by multiplying 0.61 x 0.96 x 0.56 = 33%. This means that a female,
liberal-appointed judge with a background in criminal defence will admit at a
rate of 33% of her exclusion rate, equating to a 25% chance of admission and
75% chance of exclusion.

144. This is the same method used by Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 42 at 329-42.
145. The definition of the relative odds (also known as the odds ratio) is the probability of an
event divided by the probability of a non-event. Imagine drawing a ball from a box with
three colored balls (red, yellow, and blue). If the probability of drawing a red ball were 1/3,
then the probability of the non-event would be 2/3. The odds ratio of drawing a red ball
can therefore be expressed as 1/2, 50%, or 1:2. If one knew the odds ratio for drawing a
red ball were 50%, one could also infer that the probability of drawing a non-red ball was
1/50%, or 2, which means that probability of drawing a non-red ball was twice that of
drawing a red ball.
146. Since the odds ratio is the odds of the event divided by the odds of the non-event, then 61%
= probability of event / (1 - probability of event), which implies that the probability of the
event is 1/(1+(1/0.61)) = 38%.
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TABLE 15: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS OF EXCLUSIONARY DECISION (ADMIT
OR EXCLUDE) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS AS
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variables

Relative Odds

P-value

1.013418

0.921

Judge’s gender
Male
Judge’s Background:
Defence

0.565538

0*

Other

0.734208

0.025*

Liberal

0.955091

0.715

Social Democrat

0.668279

0.026*

Constant (Female + Conservative + Crown)

0.610201

0.002*

Party of Appointment

Base Outcome: Exclude
* indicates significance at the 5% level
** indicates significance at the 10% level
Log Likelihood = -881.73
Number of observations = 1,470
pseudo R2= 0.0124
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) = 1771.46

To see this more concretely, look again at Table 12, above. Table 12 contains the
rates for judges by level of court, gender, and background. One can construct
numbers from that table that indicate that the number of admissions by “female +
liberal + defence counsel” was seventeen out of a total of seventy-three decisions.
This means that these judges had a 23% admission rate, which results in an odds
ratio of 23/77 = 30.4%. While this is not exactly 33%, keep in mind that Table
12 does not include party of appointment. Had we been able to construct a
four-way table, the odds would have been closer to 33%. This is the advantage of
the multivariate logistic approach.
Table 15 also shows that judicial gender is statistically insignificant, and
the only political affiliation that matters is a social democratic relative to a
conservative counterpart. In other words, professional background matters more
than gender or party.
When we add the level of court as an explanatory variable, Table 16, below,
results. In this model, the baseline judge is a female prosecutor appointed by
a conservative government to a provincial court. The odds that such a judge
will admit evidence are lower than in Table 15, and the difference is statistically
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significant. This means that presence on a superior court makes exclusion less
likely. As with the model in Table 15, professional background is significant, and
gender is insignificant.
However, when court level is included, party of appointment becomes
insignificant. This supports the finding discussed in Part III(C)(6), above, that
the difference in exclusion rates between the two courts is not an artifact of
differential party of appointment distributions. In other words, it appears that
the difference arises from factors intrinsic to the level of court itself and not from
any of the control variables such as gender or party of appointment.
TABLE 16: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS OF EXCLUSIONARY DECISION (ADMIT
OR EXCLUDE) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND
COURT LEVEL AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Relative Odds

P-value

Court: Superior

Variables

1.457197

0.005*

Judge’s Gender: Male

1.04654

0.736

Judge’s Background:
Defence

0.579061

0*

Other

0.686964

0.008*

Liberal

1.041766

0.753

Social Democrat

0.827355

0.338

Constant (Female + Provincial Court + Crown +
Conservative)

0.491319

0*

Party of Appointment:

Base outcome: exclude
* indicates significance at the 5% level
** indicates significance at the 10% level
Log Likelihood = -877.74
Number of observations = 1,470
pseudo R2= 0.0169
AIC = 1771.486

Lastly, we added the jurisdiction variable, with results reported in Table 17,
below. The model’s baseline is a female prosecutor appointed to the provincial
court by a conservative government in Alberta. This regression reveals that judges
in British Columbia, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Quebec are significantly
less likely to admit evidence than those in Alberta. As in the previous regressions,
professional background and court level are statistically significant; gender and
party of appointment are not.
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TABLE 17: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS OF EXCLUSIONARY DECISION (ADMIT
OR EXCLUDE) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS,
COURT LEVEL, AND JURISDICTION AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variables

Relative Odds

P-value

1.488894

0.004*

BC

0.54379

0.022*

MB

0.764409

0.536

NB

2.567663

0.166

NL

0.298813

0.012*

NS

0.231507

0.01*

NT

2.78E-13

0.987

NU

1.049162

0.973

ON

0.756749

0.147

Court: Superior
Province:

PE

5.33E-07

0.993

QC

0.536961

0.012*

SK

0.802369

0.447

YT

0.538431

0.313

Gender: Male

1.024006

0.864

Background:
Defence

0.561818

0*

Other

0.635216

0.002*

Liberal

1.116199

0.431

Social Democrat

0.945887

0.807

Constant: (Female + Provincial Court + Alberta +
Crown + Conservative)

0.702862

0.132

Party of Appointment:

Base outcome: exclude
* indicates significance at the 5% level
** indicates significance at the 10% level
Log Likelihood = -862.809
Number of observations = 1,470
pseudo R2= 0.0336
AIC = 1765. 619
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The overall conclusion to be drawn from these models is that professional
background, court level, and jurisdiction help to predict exclusionary decisions;
gender and party of appointment do not.
As we explore more fully in Part IV, below, in our view, the significance
of professional background and jurisdiction provides support for the attitudinal
model of adjudication. In other words, judges’ practice background and
(in some cases) jurisdiction influence their decision as to whether to exclude
unconstitutionally obtained evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter
regardless of legal considerations and case characteristics. Court level, in contrast,
is likely an artifact of the fact that, on average, superior courts try more serious
criminal offences than provincial courts. While this is not an aspect of attitudinal
judging, it does support the hypothesis that, regardless of doctrinal admonitions
to the contrary, judges are less inclined to exclude evidence obtained from Charter
violations for more serious crimes.
D. INTERNAL VARIABLES
1.

NON-DOCTRINAL VARIABLES

We next tested for the effect of case-specific, “internal” variables on the decision
to admit or exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Charter. These variables
may be grouped into two categories. The first consists of case characteristics
that might plausibly influence the exclusionary decision but are not directly
considered in the doctrine. In other words, they fall (mostly) outside the scope
of positive law. We examined the accused’s gender, the type of offence, the type
of evidence obtained, and whether the judge considered the seriousness of the
offence to be a significant factor (“treatment of offence seriousness”).
The latter variable requires further explanation. As discussed in Part I(B),
above, the jurisprudence is ambiguous on whether crime severity counts in the
Grant analysis. Some courts take the view that it is a neutral factor. Others have
held that, all else equal, courts should be more reluctant to exclude evidence in
more serious cases than less serious ones.147 We therefore coded decisions as giving
this factor either a neutral treatment (offence seriousness treated as insignificant
or not discussed) or a positive one (offence seriousness treated as significant).

147. Note that the judge classified the offence as being anything less than moderately serious in
only twenty-four out of 1,472 cases (1.6%). The evidence was excluded in all but two of
these cases, and in only half of those twenty-four cases did the judge state that the relative
non-seriousness of the offence weighed in favour of admission.
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To assess the influence of these variables, we ran a logistic regression. Table
18, below, shows the results of the estimation. The baseline case is a trial in the
Provincial Court of Alberta with multiple accused (at least one of each gender)
charged with a child pornography offence. The evidence sought to be excluded
is child pornography, and the judge has treated offence seriousness as a neutral
factor. The baseline judicial characteristics remain a female prosecutor appointed
by a conservative government.
As shown in Table 18, below, this regression confirmed the continuing
significance of jurisdiction for British Columbia, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia,
and Quebec, compared to Alberta. Professional background also remains
significant in the same manner as before. Among the new internal variables,
gender of the accused is significant, raising the odds of exclusion substantially.
As discussed in Part I(A)(1), above, this is consistent with research suggesting that
criminal courts treat female defendants more leniently than males.
The “treatment of offence seriousness” variable also proved significant, raising
the odds of admission dramatically (in the order of two to four times). Notably,
when we added this variable to the model, the previously observed difference
between provincial and superior courts disappeared. As we elaborate in Part
IV(B), below, this supports the inference that the difference between provincial
and superior courts’ exclusion rates stems from the more serious nature of the
offences tried in the latter.
Lastly, with one exception, neither offence type nor evidence type proved
significant.148 The exception is for evidence characterized as “statements of
the accused,” which substantially increases the odds of exclusion. However,
as discussed in Part I(B) (and further elaborated in Part III(D)(2)), above, the
characterization of evidence as a statement of the accused (as compared to
any other type of evidence) weighs in favour of exclusion under positive law.
The subcategorizations that we used for non-statement evidence (e.g., child
pornography, drugs, firearms, impaired driving samples) are not doctrinal factors
and do not appear to have any significant effect on the exclusionary decision.149
148. At the court of appeal level, in contrast, Hausegger, McNabb, and Riddell found that
weapons and drugs (as well as statements) were more likely to be admitted, controlling for
other variables. Supra note 4 at 14, Tables 3 & 4.
149. This finding contradicts previous research showing differential exclusion rates for various
types of physical evidence, including distinctly lower exclusion rates for guns. See Madden,
“Marshalling,” supra note 3 at 242-46; Asselin, “Trends,” supra note 3, Table 8; Jochelson,
Huang & Murchison, supra note 3, Table 6; Johnson, Jochelson & Weir, supra note 3, Table
21. These studies, it should be noted, did not test for statistical significance and did not
control for other variables.
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TABLE 18: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS OF EXCLUSIONARY DECISION (ADMIT
OR EXCLUDE) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS,
COURT LEVEL, AND NON-DOCTRINAL CASE CHARACTERISTICS AS
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Relative Odds
Ratio

P-value

1.08803

0.648

BC

0.531926

0.031*

MB

0.852064

0.729

NB

2.14179

0.333

NL

0.307042

0.019*

NS

0.228967

0.013*

NT

1.72E-12

0.989

NU

3.514507

0.478

ON

0.783404

0.242

Variables
Court: Superior
Province:

PE

6.57E-07

0.992

QC

0.457976

0.003*

SK

0.788976

0.441

YT

0.411827

0.16

Judge’s Gender: Male

0.934513

0.647

Judge’s Background:
Defence

0.521822

0*

Other

0.682223

0.016*

Liberal

1.094424

0.548

Social Democrat

1.028585

0.906

1.211707

0.61

Domestic

4.85E-06

0.988

Drugs

0.655501

0.574

Judge’s Party of Appointment:

Accused’s Gender:
Female
0.389352
0.031*
Male
Offence Type:

550

(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

TABLE 18: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS OF EXCLUSIONARY DECISION (ADMIT
OR EXCLUDE) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS,
COURT LEVEL, AND NON-DOCTRINAL CASE CHARACTERISTICS AS
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Guns

1.40923

0.671

Impaired

0.549157

0.429

Morals

0.291248

0.377

Other

0.886825

0.883

Property

0.411158

0.309

Regulatory

0.382445

0.33

Sex

0.968365

0.967

Theft

1.46E+07

0.993

Violence

0.907291

0.897

N/A

2.57778

0*

Significant

3.810689

0*

Digital

2.206563

0.335

Drugs

0.725682

0.699

Guns

0.64252

0.618

Images

0.610751

0.649

Multiple

0.66168

0.618

Other

1.460846

0.645

Sample

0.845428

0.839

Statement

0.208466

0.053**

Witness

1.647087

0.668

Constant: Provincial Court + Alberta + Conservative + Both Genders + Child Porn Offence +
Child Porn Evidence + Offence Insignificant

0.607367

0.449

Weight of offence:

Evidence type:

Base outcome: exclude
* indicates significance at the 5% level
** indicates significance at the 10% level
Log Likelihood = -784.969
Number of observations = 1,470
pseudo R2= 0.1208
AIC = 1659.94
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2.

DOCTRINAL VARIABLES

i.

NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE

As mentioned, the pre-Grant jurisprudence drew a sharp distinction between
(1) statements of the accused and compelled bodily samples, and (2) other
evidence. Evidence from the former category was almost always subject to an
exclusionary presumption; evidence from the latter was not. Consistent with this
dichotomy, our sample of 2007 cases shows high exclusion rates for statements
(n=27, 85.2%) and samples (n=51, 86.3%) and a substantially lower rate for
other evidence (n=84, 64.3%).150 As a result of Grant, most would have predicted
a sharply reduced exclusion rate for samples (indeed, the Court in Grant strongly
hinted at this) and unchanged exclusion rates for statements (which are still
subject to an exclusionary presumption) and other evidence (which Grant did
not directly affect).
Our data mostly confirms these predictions. The 2013–2018 exclusion
rate is 73% for bodily samples, 86.3% for statements, and 63.45% for other
evidence.151 Comparing the two time periods, only the exclusion rates for bodily
samples are significantly different.152 The post-Grant bodily sample rate, however,
is higher than many would have predicted immediately after Grant. Though
substantially lower than the rate in 2007 (86%), it remains higher than the
overall rate. Given the Court’s expressed preference in Grant for the admission
of this kind of evidence, this is perhaps a surprising result. But as noted in Part
I(B), above, many lower courts have found that the taking of bodily samples
(overwhelmingly, breath samples from impaired driving stops) often involves
serious police misconduct that intrudes substantially on drivers’ liberty interests.
In light of this jurisprudence, the 73% exclusion rate (very close to the overall
rate) is less surprising.

150. The difference between the average exclusion rates for sample, statement, and other is
statistically significant at the 5% level, with t-statistics of 2.76 and 2.11 respectively.
The difference between the exclusion rates for sample and statement are not statistically
significant at the 5% or 10% level, with a t-statistic of 0.1.
151. The differences between these rates of exclusion are statistically significant at the 5%
level, with t-statistics of 3.82 when comparing sample with others, 6.18 when comparing
statement with others, and 3.54 when comparing statement with sample.
152. The t-statistic was 2.02, which is significant at the 5% level.
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ii.

“OBTAINED IN A MANNER” THAT VIOLATES THE CHARTER

As mentioned in Part I(B), above, evidence is not eligible for exclusion under
section 24(2) unless it was “obtained in a manner” that violated the Charter.153
We did not include cases in our database if this criterion was not met. However,
in most included cases (85%), the court did not discuss the issue, presumably
because the prosecution did not contest it. It was assumed by the court and
parties, in other words, that the evidence was obtained in a manner infringing
at least one Charter right. Not surprisingly, when the issue was contested, the
exclusion rate (61.3%) was significantly lower than the average rate (70.4%).154
This can be explained by the fact that when the connection between the violation
and the state’s acquisition of the evidence is weak, the court is (all else equal) more
likely to find that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of
justice into disrepute.155
iii. GRANT FACTORS

As mentioned in Part I(B), above, in Grant, the Court decreed that three factors
drive the exclusionary discretion: the seriousness of the Charter-infringing police
conduct, its impact on the claimant’s Charter-protected interests, and society’s
interests in an adjudication on the merits. As shown in Table 19, below, our
data unsurprisingly confirm that trial judges exclude evidence significantly more
than the average when they characterize the Charter-infringing state conduct as
“serious” (91.7%); “moderate” violations result in excluded evidence less than half
of the time (45.9%); and “slight” infringements even less frequently (11.7%).156
TABLE 19: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY SERIOUSNESS OF
STATE MISCONDUCT
Moderate

N/A

Serious

Slight

Number

90

43

870

33

Rate

45.9

93.5

91.7

11.7

153. Charter, supra note 1, s 24(2).
154. The t-statistic for the difference between the two exclusion rates was 3.24, which is
statistically significant at the 5% level.
155. See generally Grant, supra note 74 at para 122; Côté, supra note 84 at paras 66-70.
156. When comparing the mean exclusion rate for N/A (seriousness not assessed) with
moderate, the t-statistic is 8.99; serious versus moderate the t-statistic is 18.06; slight versus
moderate, the t-statistic is 11.37; serious versus N/A, the t-statistic is 0.37; slight versus
N/A, the t-statistic is 15.92; and slight versus serious, the t-statistic is 36.45. These are all
statistically significantly different from each other at the 5% level, with the exception of
serious versus N/A.
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Table 20 similarly shows that exclusion is highly probable when judges gauge the
violation’s impact on the claimant to be “serious” (92.4%). “Moderate” effects are
associated with only a modest diminishment of exclusion (64.6%) compared to
the overall rate, and “slight” impacts rarely result in exclusion (13.9%).157
TABLE 20: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY IMPACT OF
VIOLATION ON ACCUSED
Moderate

N/A

Serious

Slight

Number

113

65

810

48

Rate

64.6

90.3

92.4

13.9

As mentioned in Part I(B), above, a finding that evidence would have been
discovered without the Charter breach diminishes (but does not extinguish)
its impact on the accused.158 However, as indicated in Table 21, below, courts
assessed the discoverability question in only 17% of cases, excluding evidence at
a rate of 18.4% when they found that the evidence was discoverable and 97.8%
when it was not.159
TABLE 21: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY WHETHER EVIDENCE
WAS DISCOVERABLE
N/A

Discoverable

Not Discoverable

Number

918

29

89

Rate

75.1

18.4

97.8

As discussed in Part I(B), above, under the “adjudication on the merits” category,
judges consider the evidence’s reliability and importance to the prosecution’s
case. The more reliable and important the evidence, the more likely it will be
157. When comparing the mean exclusion rate for N/A (impact not assessed) with moderate,
the t-statistic was 5.75; serious versus moderate, the t-statistic is 10.51; slight versus
moderate, the t-statistic is 17.16; serious versus N/A, the t-statistic is 0.53; slight versus
N/A, the t-statistic is 18.5; and slight versus serious, the t-statistic is 38.85. These are all
statistically significantly different from each other at the 5% level, with the exception of
serious versus N/A.
158. When the evidence was found to be not discoverable, the judge characterized the impact of
the violation as being “serious” 91% of the time (81/89).
159. The t-statistic for comparing the mean exclusion rate for “not discoverable” with
“discoverability assumed” (N/A) is 5.03; not discoverable versus N/A, the t-statistic is 16.11;
and discoverable versus not discoverable, the t-statistic is 14.50. All of these differences are
statistically significant at the 5% level.
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admitted. Though they may also consider the seriousness of the offence, this
factor is doctrinally equivocal. It may be interpreted as either a neutral factor or
one that weighs (at least slightly) in favour of admission.
Somewhat surprisingly, trial judges referred to reliability in only 61% of cases.
This may be explained by the fact that reliability issues arise almost exclusively
with statement evidence, which comprise only 13% of cases. As shown in Table
22, below, when the evidence was found to be reliable, the exclusion rate was
64.1%. Evidence deemed unreliable was almost always excluded (96.1%).160
However, we can assume that in cases in which the issue was not mentioned, the
evidence was reliable. Adding these cases to those where reliability was expressly
found yields an exclusion rate of 69.5%, only 1% lower than the overall rate.
It thus appears that, while unreliable evidence is almost always excluded, the
fact that evidence is prima facie reliable has little if any effect on the section
24(2) decision.
TABLE 22: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY RELIABILITY OF EVIDENCE
N/A

Reliable

Unreliable

Number

408

579

49

Rate

78.8

64.1

96.1

As expected, the more important a judge considers the evidence to be, the less
likely it will be excluded (see Table 23, below). The effect of this factor appears
to be modest, however. In 39% of cases, judges did not even refer to it. In these
cases, evidence was excluded 74.1% of the time. In an equal proportion of
cases (39%), judges considered the impugned evidence to be “critical,” yet still
excluded evidence 68% of the time.
Counterintuitively, the exclusion rate was lower (52.4%) when judges
gauged the evidence to be merely “important.”161 We speculate that this anomaly
can be explained by the significantly higher than average exclusion rate for “over
160. The t-statistics for comparing the mean exclusion rate for reliable with N/A (reliability not
assessed) is 5.92; unreliable versus N/A is 2.63; and reliable versus unreliable is 4.94. These
are all statistically significant differences at the 5% level.
161. The t-statistics for comparing the mean exclusion rate for important with critical is 3.99;
moderate versus critical is 2.63; N/A (importance not assessed) versus critical is 2.33; slight
versus critical is 3.42; moderate versus important is 5.18; N/A versus important is 5.56;
slight versus important is 5.50; N/A versus moderate is 1.93; slight versus moderate is 0.32;
and slight versus N/A is 2.33. These are all statistically significant differences at the 5% level,
except the N/A comparison with moderate, which is significant at the 10% level, and the
slight with moderate comparison, which is statistically insignificant.
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0.80” impaired driving cases (74.0%),162 where the prosecution’s case typically
collapses when bodily sample evidence is excluded.163
TABLE 23: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY EVIDENTIARY IMPORTANCE
Critical

Important

Moderate

N/A

Slight

Number

393

89

62

430

62

Rate

68.0

52.4

84.9

74.1

87.3

Lastly, offence seriousness does not appear to play a significant role in section
24(2) trial decisions as a matter of positive law. As shown in Table 24, below,
in almost a third of cases, the judge did not refer to it. The exclusion rate in these
cases (70.8%) was only fractionally greater than the overall rate (70.4%). When
offence seriousness was considered, judges classified the offence as “serious” 90.5%
of the time. The exclusion rate in these cases was only slightly lower (68.5%) than
the overall rate. This could be interpreted as a signal that courts have generally
interpreted Grant as effectively nullifying this factor.
TABLE 24: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY OFFENCE SERIOUSNESS
Moderate

N/A

Serious

Slight

Number

42

478

494

22

Rate

80.8

70.8

68.5

91.7

However, as discussed in Part III(D)(1), above, we also coded for how judges
treated the offence seriousness factor. As shown in Table 25, below, most (56%)
did not speak to the question. The exclusion rate for this group was 71.2%.
Of those who did, 27% said that it was not significant; the remaining 73% said
it was “significant” or “weighty.” In the former group, the exclusion rate was
85.3%; in the latter, it was 60.9%.164 This suggests that judges who do express a
162. The average exclusion rate for all other categories of offences was 67.3%, and the t-statistic
for the difference between the average exclusion rate for the impaired category and all others
was 2.85, which is statistically significant at the 5% level.
163. Judges gauged the bodily sample evidence to be “critical” to the prosecution’s case in 78% of
cases where some characterization was given. Statements (17%) and other evidence (65%)
were less often characterized as critical.
164. The t-statistic for the difference between the mean exclusion rate for N/A (significance of
offence seriousness not discussed) with insignificant is 4.14; significant versus insignificant is
6.54; and significant versus N/A is 3.81. These are all statistically significantly different from
each other at the 5% level.
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view on the factor’s significance are more likely to exclude (factor insignificant)
or admit (factor significant) than judges who do not. And as shown in Table
18, above, our regression model including non-doctrinal variables suggests that
offence seriousness exerts some influence on exclusionary decisions regardless of
doctrinal treatment.
TABLE 25: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY TREATMENT OF “OFFENCE
SERIOUSNESS” FACTOR
N/A

Insignificant

Significant

Number

586

191

259

Rate

71.2

85.3

60.9

We combined all of these factors into one regression as shown in Table 26, below.
Consistent with the findings discussed above, exclusion was significantly favoured
when: (1) the state misconduct was serious, (2) the impact of the violation
on the accused’s Charter-protected interests was serious, (3) the evidence was
non-discoverable, (4) the evidence was unreliable, (5) the evidence was less
than important to the prosecution’s case, or (6) the evidence was a statement
or bodily sample. Admission was significantly favoured when: (1) the evidence
was expressly found to have been obtained in a manner that violates the Charter,
(2) the misconduct was slight, (3) the impact on the accused was slight, (4) the
evidence was discoverable, and (5) the seriousness of the offence was treated as
a significant factor. The classification of an offence as “serious” also weighed in
favour of admission (but is significant only at the 10% level).
TABLE 26: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS OF EXCLUSIONARY DECISION
(ADMIT OR EXCLUDE) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND GRANT FACTORS AS
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Admit

Relative odds

P-value

1.262714

0.432

Serious

0.071202

0*

Slight

8.675451

0*

Serious

0.155953

0*

Slight

12.14447

0*

Court
Superior
Seriousness of State
Misconduct

Impact on Accused
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Reliability of Evidence
Reliable

1.33811

0.348

Unreliable

0.080759

0.048*

Importance of Evidence
Important

1.372963

0.383

Moderate

0.145135

0.002*

Slight

0.059873

0*

1.739669

0.077**

No

0.100285

0.013*

Yes

6.857355

0*

Obtained in Manner?
Yes
Discoverability of the Evidence

Seriousness of Offence
N/A

6.175271

0.011*

Serious

3.730522

0.054**

Slight

0.10138

0.14

Category of Evidence
Sample

0.245928

0*

Statement

0.20985

0.001*

Treatment of Offence Seriousness
N/A

1.622164

0.313

Significant

2.864326

0.009*

Constant165

0.250916

0.106

Base Outcome: Admit
* indicates significance at the 5% level
** indicates significance at the 10% level
Log Likelihood = -253.58
Number of observations = 1,472
pseudo R2= 0.7165
AIC = 555.18
165. The constant is a trial in provincial court where the “obtained in a manner” issue is “not
discussed (N/A)”; seriousness of the state misconduct is “moderate”; discoverability
of the evidence is “not discussed (N/A)”; impact on the accused’s Charter-protected
interests is “moderate”; importance of the evidence to the Crown is “critical”; reliability
of the evidence is “not discussed (N/A)”; seriousness of the offence is “moderate”;
treatment of offence seriousness is “insignificant,” and the type of evidence category was
“non-statement, non-sample.”
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. EXTERNAL VARIABLES

Our analysis suggests that the decision about whether to exclude unconstitutionally
obtained evidence at trial is influenced by certain extra-legal factors but not
others. Consistent with most previous studies of Canadian judges, we found little
evidence that party of appointment plays a significant role. In some respects, this
may be surprising. Whether evidence should be excluded as a remedy for rights
violations has generally been viewed as a contentious policy question dividing
conservatives and liberals.166 The governing doctrine also ostensibly gives trial
judges wide latitude to admit or exclude evidence as they see fit: They are free
to make factual findings, frame the governing doctrinal factors, and weigh those
findings and factors in the context of an open-ended balancing test.
Why, then, is party of appointment not significantly correlated with
exclusion? Unfortunately, our study cannot provide an answer. As indicated,
previous research has suggested several possibilities, including a tradition of
non-ideological judicial appointments in Canada, the tendency of trial courts to
adjudicate non-ideologically, and the weak predictive value of partisanship and
other ideology measures in criminal cases.167
We also found that judicial gender was not predictive of exclusion.
While we observed some significant pairwise differences (in provincial courts,
liberal-appointed female judges were more likely to admit than most other
gender-party combinations), gender was not significant in our regression models.
In other words, once we controlled for other external factors, judicial gender was
no longer significant. Previous research has revealed no consistent overarching
judicial gender effect in either adjudication generally or in criminal cases. Our
analysis is consistent with this pattern.
Professional background, in contrast, did correlate strongly with the
exclusion decision. Former prosecutors are less likely to exclude evidence than
former non-criminal practitioners, who are in turn less likely to exclude evidence
than former criminal defence lawyers. This finding is consistent with research in
the United States showing similar correlations between professional background

166. See generally Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims’ Rights: The New Law and Politics
of Criminal Justice (University of Toronto Press, 1999) at 46-47, 76-77; Lane V
Sunderland, “Liberals, Conservatives, and the Exclusionary Rule” (1980) 71:4 J Crim L &
Criminology 343.
167. See discussion in Part 1(A), above.
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and rulings in criminal cases generally.168 We cannot say whether this stems from
pre-professional selection bias, post-professional experience, or a combination
of both. But our study supports the widespread anecdotal impression that
prosecutors and defence lawyers are different (both from each other and from
non-criminal lawyers)169 and that this difference carries over into the judicial role.
While we do not purport to suggest ideal criteria for judicial selection, our
findings could be interpreted as supporting the appointment of judges from a
variety of professional backgrounds, including a roughly equal ratio of former
defence lawyers and former prosecutors. There is no reason to think that either
prosecutors or defence counsel should not be appointed in significant numbers.
Indeed, heavy criminal caseloads (especially in provincial court) suggest that a
criminal practice background is desirable. Any substantial change in the ratio
of prosecutors to defence counsel, however, would likely shift the exclusion rate
(and potentially other decisions in criminal cases) away from the status quo.
Jurisdiction also correlates with exclusion, at least for British Columbia,
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Quebec (more likely to exclude evidence) in
relation to Alberta (less likely). This also tracks anecdotal experience. The reasons
for this are not obvious and are not explained by differential distributions in
party of appointment. The most that we can say is that there are aspects of the
political, legal, or judicial cultures in these provinces that lead to more “liberal”
or “conservative” outcomes in at least this area of the law, regardless of party of
appointment and other factors.
Whether this is normatively optimal is a matter of opinion. On the one hand,
jurists have long asserted that jurisdictional differences in the administration of
criminal justice are a legitimate and desirable aspect of Canadian federalism.170
On this view, the ability of judges and other justice system actors to apply the law
in a manner sensitive to local conditions reflects and respects regional diversity
and provincial autonomy. Moreover, the exclusionary discretion embodied in
section 24(2) hinges on the justice system’s reputation, which presumably stems
at least in part from its standing in the local community.
On the other hand, the power to enact and regulate the enforcement of
laws relating to the criminal justice system lies exclusively with Parliament under
section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867.171 The decision to give Parliament
168. See supra notes 31-32.
169. See generally Abbe Smith, “Are Prosecutors Born or Made?” (2012) 25 Geo J Leg Ethics 943.
170. See R v Regan, 2002 SCC 12 at para 71; Dennis Baker, “The Provincial Power to (Not)
Prosecute Criminal Code Offences” (2016) 48 Ottawa L Rev 417 at 441-42.
171. (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5.
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exclusive authority over this realm was deliberately designed to foster national
unity.172 Even more important, to the extent that the provinces play a role in
the administration of criminal and quasi-criminal law enforcement, their role
is circumscribed by the Charter in the same manner that it is for the federal
government.173 In this context, it may be reasonable to expect that remedies for
fundamental rights violations be equally available to Canadians regardless of
provincial boundaries.
B. INTERNAL VARIABLES

As discussed, consistent with previous literature suggesting favourable treatment
for female criminal defendants, judges are more likely to exclude evidence when
the accused is a woman. It is doubtful that judges are conscious of this bias.
Even if they were, we do not know whether they would be able to disabuse
themselves of it.174 Nevertheless, it does not seem desirable that the accused’s
gender should influence the decision about whether to exclude unconstitutionally
obtained evidence.
We also found compelling evidence that the exclusionary decision is affected
by the seriousness of the offence. Judges who indicated that offence seriousness
was a significant consideration were much more likely to admit the evidence
than those who did not. Moreover, when we included the “treatment of offence
seriousness” variable in our regression model, the exclusion rate differential
between provincial and superior courts disappeared. In other words, judges
trying more serious offences (disproportionately in superior courts) are, all else
equal, more inclined to admit evidence than those trying less serious ones.
Whether this is normatively desirable is also contentious. To the extent
that excluding probative evidence is a social cost (by making it more difficult to
convict the factually guilty), that cost is undoubtedly greater for more serious
offences than less serious ones.175 On the other hand, the regular admission of
172. See Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61 at paras 68, 77; Mark
Carter, “Criminal Law in the Federal Context” in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie
Des Rosiers, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (Oxford University
Press, 2017) 475 at 476.
173. See Charter, supra note 1, s 32(1).
174. See generally Jerry Kang et al, “Implicit Bias in the Courtroom” (2012) 59 UCLA L Rev
1124; Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir, “Judicial Decision-Making: A Behavioral Perspective”
in Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and
the Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 664 at 684-86.
175. See David M Paciocco, “Section 24(2): Lottery or Law—The Appreciable Limits of
Purposive Reasoning” (2011) 58 Crim LQ 15 at 52-55.
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unconstitutionally obtained evidence in serious cases would likely erode law
enforcement’s incentive to comply with the Charter, increasing the harms caused
by rights violations to the factually guilty and innocent alike.176
As discussed, the Court has not issued a firm and consistent directive as to
whether offence seriousness should be considered. The Court should clarify its
position by directing trial judges to either count or not count offence seriousness
in the exclusionary calculus. As the American experience demonstrates, even
under the latter scenario, admission is still likely to be more common for the most
serious offences. But a clear policy choice by the Court would likely limit this
effect. If the Court chooses the opposite policy, trial judges could transparently
weigh offence seriousness in the balance.

V. CONCLUSION
In one sense, our study is very narrow. We examined only trial decisions involving
a single question of constitutional criminal procedure: Whether evidence
obtained in violation of the Charter should be excluded under section 24(2).
However, trial judges confront this question many hundreds of times annually,177
and their decision often dramatically influences the trial’s outcome. The decision
is also a product of an open-ended balancing inquiry instantiating the liberal/due
process versus conservative/crime control policy spectrum. Statistical analyses of
the factors influencing this decision provide some insight on the extent to which
judges’ decisions are shaped by non-legal, “Realist” factors.
The focus of previous research in this vein has been on judicial ideology.
We found no significant correlation between party of appointment and section
24(2) trial decisions. This is broadly consistent with previous research showing
that party of appointment (1) does not strongly influence trial decisions
in the United States; and (2) is not strongly predictive of case outcomes in
Canadian appeal cases.
Nor did we find any significant effect for judicial gender: Female and male
judges’ exclusion rates are essentially the same, even when controlling for other

176. See John AE Pottow, “Constitutional Remedies in the Criminal Context: A Unified
Approach to Section 24 (Part III)” (2000) 44 Crim LQ 223 at 229-31; Penney, supra note
77 at 138-39; Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, 2nd ed (Thomas Reuters
Canada, 2019) at para 10.1730.
177. Recall from note 122 that we estimated that there were approximately 1,903 unreported
decisions during the six-year period of our dataset, coupled with 1,472 reported ones. This
yields an average of approximately 563 decisions per year.
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factors. This finding is also generally consistent with previous studies finding no
strong, overarching judicial gender effect in criminal or non-criminal cases.
We did find significant effects, however, for two attitudinal factors that have
received less attention in the literature: professional background and jurisdiction.
Positive law does not dictate that accused persons have a better chance of having
evidence excluded when being tried by a former criminal defence lawyer than by
a former prosecutor. Nor does it support the finding that exclusion should be
more common in British Columbia and Quebec than in Alberta. Yet these factors
do appear to exert substantial influence on the exclusionary decision, as does the
accused’s gender.
That said, there is little doubt that positive law plays an important (and
quite possibly dominant) role in exclusionary decisions. Our analysis of internal
doctrinal variables shows that trial judges apply the law in the manner prescribed
by the Supreme Court, with one possible and partial exception. While the doctrine
states that offence seriousness should have (at most) a modest influence on section
24(2) decisions, our analysis suggests that it often plays a substantial role.
Further empirical research on judicial decision-making in Canada, especially
at the trial level, would be welcome. Perhaps the most obvious avenue would be
to apply similar methodologies to other key decisions in criminal cases and other
types of litigation. One might predict, for example, that in comparison to former
criminal defence lawyers, former prosecutors are more likely to convict and to
impose harsher sentences. Future studies might also investigate the possible
influence of additional external variables (such as judicial age and experience)178
or explore additional measures of judicial ideology.179

178. See e.g. Hoffman et al, supra note 28.
179. See generally Cross, supra note 9 at 20-21.
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Background
Defence
Defence
Other
Other
Other
Other
Defence

Subcategory
One

Court Level

Provincial

Provincial

Provincial

Provincial

Provincial

Provincial

Superior

Male

Male

Male

Female

Female

Male

Male

Gender
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Provincial

Provincial

Provincial

Provincial

Provincial

Provincial

Court Level

Subcategory
Two

Crown

Crown

Crown

Crown

Crown

Crown

Crown

Background

Male

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Gender

5
5
10

2.1
1.8

5

2.1

10

5

2.5

1.7

5

2.1

2.4

Level of
Significance

t-statistic

TABLE A: SUBCATEGORIES AND LEVEL OF COURT THAT ARE STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANTLY
DIFFERENT FROM EACH OTHER, INCLUDING THE T-STATISTIC AND LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE
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TABLE B: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY LEVEL OF COURT, JUDGES’
GENDER, AND JUDGES’ PARTY OF APPOINTMENT (“N/A” CATEGORY OMITTED)
Provincial
Conservative
Male
Female
Total

Liberal

Superior
Social
Democrat

Conservative

Liberal

Number

217

336

163

253

123

Rate

70.5

74.4

76.1

66.0

61.0

Number

43

102

67

83

74

Rate

81.4

65.7

79.1

62.7

68.9

Number

260

438

230

336

197

Rate

72.3

72.4

77.0

65.2

64.0

TABLE C: THE VARIOUS PROVINCIAL COURT SUBCATEGORIES THAT ARE
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM EACH OTHER, INCLUDING THE
T-STATISTIC AND LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE
Subcategory One Compared to

Subcategory Two

Gender & Party

Gender & Party

t-statistic

Level of
Significance

Female Social Democrat

Female Liberal

1.88

10

Male Social Democrat

Female Liberal

1.81

10

Male Liberal

Female Liberal

1.7

10

Female Liberal

Female Conservative

1.9

10
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TABLE D: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY LEVEL OF COURT, JUDGES’
BACKGROUND, AND JUDGES’ PARTY OF APPOINTMENT
Provincial
Conservative
Crown

Number
Rate

Defence

Number
Rate

Other
Total

Liberal

Superior
Social
Democrat

Conservative

Liberal

67

143

54

87

38

70.2

63.6

64.8

58.6

63.2

87

189

83

54

42

72.4

76.2

83.1

72.2

71.4

Number

106

106

93

195

117

Rate

73.6

77.4

78.5

66.2

61.5

260

438

230

336

197

72.3

72.4

77.0

34.8

64.0
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TABLE E: VARIOUS SUBCATEGORIES BY COURT LEVEL THAT ARE STATISTICALLY
SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM EACH OTHER, INCLUDING THE T-STATISTIC
AND LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE
Subcategory One

Compared To

Subcategory Two

Court Level

Background

Court
Le vel

Background

t-statistic

Level of
Significance

Provincial

Other Liberal

Provincial

Crown
Social
Democrat

1.65

10

Provincial

Other
Conservative

Provincial

Crown
Liberal

1.71

10

Provincial

Defence Social
Democrat

Provincial

Crown
Conservative

1.74

10

Provincial

Other Social
Democrat

Provincial

Crown
Social
Democrat

1.76

10

Provincial

Defence Social
Democrat

Provincial

Crown
Social
Democrat

2.31

5

Provincial

Non-criminal
Liberal

Provincial

Crown
Liberal

2.36

5

Provincial

Non-criminal
Social Democrat

Provincial

Crown
Liberal

2.46

5

Provincial

Defence Liberal

Provincial

Crown
Liberal

2.50

5

Provincial

Defence Social
Democrat

Provincial

Crown
Liberal

3.12

5

Superior

Defence
Conservative

Superior

Crown
Conservative

1.73

10

